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Introduction 
To me, film is a means of making and recording music. Not 'music' 
in the sense of 'aural stimulation' alone, but rather in the sense in which 
the word was used by Pythagoras and Plato in ancient Greece: music as 
the rhythmic ordering of all things, the balance and proportion of any-
thing. 
This paper, then, is both an introduction to the film and a first step 
toward the structuring of a vision. For I have lived with images in my mind, 
fragments of moving colors and sounds, with which I could not work for 
want of a notation by which to describe and control them. It is in this 
sense that the task of this thesis was not chosen by me, but rather forced 
upon me by the presence of images which I could neither forget nor 
understand. 
The goal of this endeavor, thus, is simply put: to have made clear to 
myself the mathematical (i.e.,musical) structure of the images I have known, 
and to have derived therefrom a set of procedures useful in the process of 
composing such images into a film. I have not sought for a 'notation' for 
film, in the sense of providing a system in which to formulate production 
scripts. Rather, I have sought for a set of procedures by which to describe 
and control images in the process of composing a film. By the end of 
Section III below, the extent to which I have been successful will be apparent. 
If matters are pursued at some length in the forthcoming pages which 
strike you, the reader, as being only faintly relevant to film, perhaps you will 
understand that my conception of the task of the filmmaker is somewhat 
more stringent than most, and that the matters with which I have concerned 
myself are essential to doing that which I wish to do with film. It is too 
much to expect that the issues raised below will prove of interest to the 
majority of filmmakers, for the majority of films by filmmakers has proven 
of only passing interest to me. Rather, it is a very few films by a handful 
of filmmakers by which I have been enchanted and toward which this 
thesis is directed. And if, by the end of it, I shall have shown you how I 
have come nearer to the goal of being able to compose like them, I shall 
be satisfied. 
1. 
Section I: On the functions of mathematics and art 
1. Before one can compose anything, one must first know something of 
the sort of thing one is going to compose. But the task of coming to know 
what sort of thing anything is,involves either, or both, of two chores: (a) 
giving the thing a name (which chore is not always trivial); and (b) coming 
to recognize the function of the thing (i.e.,coming to understand the rela-
tionships in which the thing exists with other things of its sort). 
The task itself is commonly designated 'research', and 'research' has 
become equated in our pragmatic society with 'scientific research' (i.e.i re-
search whose results can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the scientific 
method of experiment and observation). The technique of scientific re-
search has often been restricted to manipulating known entities into new 
and untested relationships, which were then subjected to testing. If the 
tests were satisfactory, further tests were devised; if unsatisfactory, the new 
relationships were either modified for retesting or rejected. 
If it were not apparent prior to our century, however, the advent of 
relativity and quantum mechanics ought to have demonstrated that the 
manipulation of known entities (i.e.,variables) into new and untested 
patterns is neither the principal nor the essential task of research. The 
theory of relativity did not give new names to new combinations of several 
older variables, as one might coin the word 'event' to mean 'any point in 
space and time'. Nor had the older variables of electrornagnetics and 
gravitational theory been recombined in fascinating and productive new 
ways. 'Space-time' simply, was not a new name for 'space and time'. And 
Einstein's theory of gravitation was no more a recombining of Newton's 
theory of gravitation with Maxwell's electromagnetic equations than had 
Newton's or Maxwell's discoveries been a recombining of the known vari-
ables of mechanics, and electricity and magnetism, in their time. Rather, 
the theory of relativity postulated a new sort of entity (space-time) 
whose essential characteristics could not be defined by recombining the 
variables of classical pre-relativity mechanics. That certain features of 
the new conception could be pointed-to by using the names of older vari-
ables was essential so that men might come to understand the terms of 
the new theory by getting some idea of how the older structures would 
have to be reinterpreted under the new conception. But notice: although 
older terms could, in some instances, be redefined in terms of the new 
conception, the new conception could not be interpreted in the older 
terms. 
Similarly, when situations occurred in the examination of nuclear 
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structures which caused men to ask 'Is the electron a wave or a particle?' 
(etc.), a new conception was required (which has yet to be fully articu-
lated). Quantum physicists found that they could not define their new 
conceptions in the older terms of 'mass', 'momentum', 'wave', 'particle', 
etc. Some of the older terms could be redefined and used properly in 
certain circumstances; but it was the new terms which provided the 
logical foundation for the analysis and specification of the old, not the 
reverse. 
The history of research has been largely determined by events of 
the above kind. Yet one area of research, the mathematical, has played 
a curious game with the trend. As new conceptions arose (eg.,irrational 
numbers, complex numbers, analytic geometry, the calculus), the devel-
opment of the field followed much the same pattern as other fields with 
a singular twist: each new development was seen as an addition to, not a 
redefinition of older conceptions (and truths). Thus, complex numbers 
were conceived as an addition to the real numbers, as had been the irra-
tionals (when finally accepted) to the integers, etc. When it was discov-
ered that the length of the diagonal of a square could not be expressed 
as an integral ratio of the lengths of the sides, a new kind of number was 
eventually admitted to the haven formerly occupied by the integers alone: 
irrational numbers. But the discovery was not considered as a means of 
redefining integral numbers. Rather, '1', '2', '3', etc., and the fractions 
remained as before, with room being made in the continuum for numbers 
such as tif ( = 1.414...). Even with the discovery of analytic geom-
etry, it was decided that geometry and algebra had thereby been united, 
not that geometry and algebra had thereby been redefined. 
It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that the logical advances 
of the late 19th and 20th centuries found their purported application 
in the foundations of mathematics. As philosophy had worked with 
propositions for centuries, considering them to be true or false as they 
did or did not reflect (in some sense) the objects of the universe, but 
never considering the objects of the universe to have been redefined by 
the discovery of a new facet of language. logicians saw the constancy 
of the concept of 'number' in mathematics as amenable to their methods. 
If the axiomatic method of logic could produce a timeless definition of 
number, then the timeless truths of mathematics (as expressing proposi-
tions true of numbers) would have been reduced to truths of logic. 
Godel's celebrated discovery of the necessary incompleteness of 
any axiomatization of arithmetic shot this hope. But the challenge 
remained: could all truths of mathematics be expressed using logical 
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notations alone? The work of Russell, Whitehead, Church, Quine, et. al., 
has clearly demonstrated that such is the case, given that mathematical 
statements are expressions of propositions about numbers, and that new 
mathematical discoveries are discoveries of new propositions timelessly 
true of numbers, not discoveries requiring that the notion of 'number' 
be thereby redefined. 
When mathematicians balked at the new mathematical logic, sensing 
that it had little to do with creativity in mathematics in any sense, they 
had only themselves to blame. Had they queried more closely their founda-
tions, and, once a new discovery had occurred, not assumed that '2 + 2 + 3 = 
7' must mean the same as previously (being an eternal a priori truth), they 
might have made it a precedent of tradition that mathematics was itself 
constantly redefining its older conceptions in light of newer ones. Instead, 
they made dubious assumptions at each step about the nature of the con-
tinuum, and when a new number was discovered (or function, or approxi-
mation technique) simply made room for it among all the others. 
It is one of the assumptions of this paper that mathematical objects 
(numbers) have changed their meaning as many times in the history of 
mathematics as has the concept of 'particle' in physics, and that since the 
advent of the calculus the notion of the differentiation-integration function 
has remade the sense of mathematics (and its objects) in a profound fashion. 
This, of course, is not a paper in mathematics, but in film, though it is one 
of the purposes of this paper to show how the latter is best conceived as a 
special case of the former. I shall only briefly describe the fundamental 
mathematical notions with which I am concerned so that the tenor of the 
above assumption is more-or-less familiar, and then move as directly as 
possible into the direct applications to the structuring of a film. (To do 
this and yet remain intelligible to filmmakers is an unenviable task: if 
one should remain fluent enough to be read, one would necessarily be 
inexact in what one says. I have tried to strike a balance, but there is 
only so much that can be said in English about relations without ambiguity 
and vagueness, and the decision not to use symbolic notation may prove 
to be of more trouble than it was worth. But the choice has been made 
after consideration, and I shall not vary from it.). 
2. Mathematics has been shown to be reducible to symbolic logic in the 
following sense. Any mathematical statement expressing a proposition 
which is true or false can be restated without loss of rigor as an expression 
consisting of only three notational devices: the ' J. ' sign of truth-func-
tional logic; the notations of quantification theory; and the sign 'E' of 
4. 
class membership. As the theory of relations has been shown to be reduci-
ble to the notation of classes, and the converse, the above is equivalent to 
saying that the notations of truth-functional logic, quantification theory, 
and relation theory (class theory) are sufficient to transcribe any mathe-
matical proposition. 
But more can be said. Truth-functional logic is itself a system of 
relations in the sense that it is reducible to expressions of relations between 
propositions which, in turn, are related to either, but not both, of the truth-
values. 'true' and 'not-true' (i.e.,`false'). Quantification theory also is a 
system of relations, in the sense that it is reducible to expressions of rela-
tions between objects of two sorts (variables and predicates). 
Mathematics, thus, ought to be considered as the generalized theory 
of relations, in the sense that a theory of relations general enough to 
encompass the logic of propositions, quantification theory, and the 
theory of classes, would be adequate to express any mathematical propo-
sition. The question, of course, is whether or not the notion of a general-
ized theory of relations is a confusion. Certainly, those who have labored 
to clarify the above reduction of mathematics to the logic of propositions, 
quantification theory, and the theory of classes have done so because they 
believed that the three primitive notions, necessary and sufficient under 
the final reduction to express mathematical propositions, were as basic 
as possible (in some sense which I don't think could be further specified). 
The fact that the three basic notations are themselves relational notations, 
however, leads me to expect that a new approach might lead to a single 
primitive of which the others could be construed as special cases. In a 
sense this would require a radical re-orientation of thought away from 
propositional logic as the standard of rational clarity. (How many would 
care for such a re-orientation is of no concern at present.) 
3. Mathematics, as presently conceived, can be reduced to logic and the 
primitive 'E' of class membership. Mathematical equations, expressing 
relations of a particular kind between objects of a particular sort, are thus 
conceived to be expressing truths about classes of objects. What are the 
objects? Numbers. And, indeed, the entire program of contemporary 
mathematical logic began, and has been sustained, largely as the attempt 
to clarify the notion of 'number' — the objects with which mathematical 
expressions are taken to be concerned. 
But a curious fact emerges when one examines the definitions of 
number so conceived. "Any objects will serve as numbers as long as the 
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arithmetical operations are defined for them and the laws of arithmetic 
are preserved." (Quine)1 Thus, certain variations occur between systems 
of set theory as to what is to count as the number 0, 1, 2, etc. That un-
limitedly many alternative versions of set theory are possible which are 
consistent and adequate is admitted. But all involve intimately the notion 
of classes of classes. Thus, (e.g.,) Zermelo took 0 arbitrarily as A , the 
null class (the class having no members), and defined the successor of a 
number x as (x} , the unit-class of x (i.e.,the class having x as sole member). 
For Zermelo, therefore, the natural numbers become: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
etc. 
All other systems, though varying in detail, involve equally at some point 
the notion of A (the null class) as basic. But the important point is not 
that the basic class have no members, but rather that the fact that it has 
members, if any, be considered irrelevant to the purpose at hand. That is, 
any class having members, no matter how many, could be taken as basic 
for the purpose of defining the real numbers if the fact that it has members 
were considered irrelevant. For example, if a, b, c, . r be considered ir-
relevant, 
• 
0 
1 
• 
. etc. 
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becomes equivalent to the system sketched above. 
The point is that the natural numbers, even on contemporary accounts, 
do not require objects of a particular sort in their definitions. Any objects 
will do, as long as they are considered irrelevant to the function being per-
formed on them. To be a number, then, is to be a function (i.e.,a relation) 
of a certain kind, and any objects will serve to elucidate the definition 
(even numbers themselves) so long as their presence is considered irrelevant. 
Indeed, it is precisely because objects of any particular kind are irrele-
vant to the definition of functions (i.e.,numbers) that functions, in hand, 
can be used to define objects (as will be seen in the following section). 
4. I shall consider the basic function (relation) to be that of differentiation-
integration. As the operations of differentiation and integration are defined 
to be operations performable only on functions, I can construe them as 
functions of functions (of functions, etc.). 
Given the notion of differentiating a function (and the function which 
we know as 'multiplication-division' taken for granted), how could the 
natural numbers 1, 2, 3, . . . be defined? Consider any object specified by 
`x'. The natural numbers can be defined as follows: 
coher e
y x 
= XXX 
= xxxx 
= XXXXX 
= XX X XXX I 
( d X 
cie_f y 
x 8 x 
3 Le..F 1 d2
Zx dx 2 / 
c!÷! ( 83 
x ‘77-b-cT ) 
5  clef I. ( 
24x d 4-
etc. 
I20x ci x 5 
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If the natural numbers be thought of as a series 1, 2, 3, . . . , the general 
function defining each member n + 1 of the series in terms of the pre-
ceding member n would thus become: 
where j = x • X cLe.C. I
 '4'19
x 
(where it must be remembered that 'n' stands for the last number previous-
ly defined in the series. That is, I have not used the notion of any number 
(undefined) to define another, and there is consequently no breach of rigor.) 
The point being stressed is that, on this account, the number 2 is the 
funCtion expressed by the symbol 1 (p', where y = x.x (i.e.,x2 ); 
x \ 
similarly with the numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, . . . The object x can be anything; 
indeed, it could even stand for the function being defined (e.g.,the number 
2 itself), for whatever x is, is irrelevant to the function being performed 
on it. That is, x is What the function being performed on it says it is. (An 
essential difference should be apparent, therefore, between what a func-
tion (an x) is, on this account, and what the subject of an English sentence 
or a variable of quantificational logic is, on other accounts. Although it 
is impossible to express the notion in a subject-predicate language like 
English without pseudo-nonsense resulting, the sense of the notion is some-
thing like this: there is no ambiguity or breach of rigor, on my account, in 
taking a function (e.g.,the number 2) as the object x in its own definition!) 
Since numbers have been defined to be functions on this account, 
mathematics (instead of being, as on contemporary accounts, the collected 
expressions of the propositions true of numbers) becomes the expression 
of functions of functions (of functions, etc.) . . . i.e.,the general theory of 
relations. 
Each of the natural numbers can be defined in the above fashion as 
a function of the differentiation-integration function. As functions, so 
defined, they can become the object of other functions. Indeed, by being 
so defined they are already the function of a more general function than 
the one which defined them uniquely, this general function being 
(I) where x • X h+i ci=ec (a l y 
In! X UiX t `) 
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This function is such that, given any natural number n as defined, the 
succeeding natural number n + 1 can be determined. In fairly-common 
terminology, the natural numbers are ordered by this general function. 
The notion of an ordered function will be of some importance in 
this paper, and I wish to be certain that the idea is intuitively clear to 
the reader. To be ordered, a function 
(a) must be determined by a function a from a function j3 prev-
iously determined by the function a
(b) must determine another function 0 by the funtion a. 
For example, the number three (3) is a function determined by function 
I from the number two (2), a function previously determined by function 
I, and the number three determines the function which is the number (4) 
by function I (which determined it). Thus, the number three is ordered 
by function I, and exists in order between the numbers two and four as 
ordered by function I. In this sense, the natural numbers cannot exist 
apart from the determination of function I. 
A random series of natural numbers, thus, is not a series of unorder-
ed numbers, but an unordered series of (ordered) numbers. That is, it 
is an ordering of the natural numbers according to some function 13 which 
is irrelevant to the purposes at hand. For any finite series of numbers, it 
can be shown algebraically that there exists a function which determines 
it, in the sense that given any number in the series the next can be deter-
mined by the function. Thus, the notion of randomness does not entail 
lack of order, but rather lack of relevancy of the order. (But I shall have 
more to say on this later.) 
5. In most mathematical textbooks, discounting the non-essential idio-
syncracies of individual authors, a function is defined equivalently to the 
following: 
A function is a correspondence that associates with each 
number x of some given set of numbers one and only 
one number y. 2
The notion is then expanded to include multi-valued functions as the 
occasion demands. 
This definition, of course, is not available to me as I have defined 
`number' in terms of 'function' above. Indeed, for me numbers are 
functions, and sets of numbers (eg.• the natural numbers) are for me 
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functions of a function; hence, on my account, the notion of 'function' 
is logically prior to either the notion of 'number' or of 'set', in virtue 
of which the customary definitions of 'function' are couched. 
Implicit in the above discussion of defining the natural numbers 
was the notion that the differentiation-integration relationship (function) 
was to be taken as basic. That is, all functions, on this account, are to be 
viewed as determined by it, including itself in the sense that a function 
is anything which can be determined by the differentiation-integration 
function. 
If this seems slightly illegitimate, let me remind you of my earlier 
assumption concerning advances in mathematical knowledge. Once a new 
concept has been discovered, it is futile to attempt to define it in older 
terms (if indeed it is a new concept, and not simply a new name for a com-
bination of older concepts). The task must rather be to redefine as many 
of the older terms in terms of the new concept as possible. Of course, 
the only terms available to me are older terms, particularly when writing 
in English, in which the new notion must be advanced. In English, the 
closest I can come to describing the fundamental notion of mathematics 
(as I see it) is to call it 'the differentiation-integration function'. But it 
must be remembered that by 'function' I do not mean what has custo-
marily been meant by the term (i.e. a notion determined by the notions 
`number' and 'see), but rather a new and more general notion in virtue of 
which 'number' and 'set' (and therefore 'ordered number') can be deter-
mined. 
(The attempts of 19th-century mathematicians to determine the 
differentiation-integration function in terms of older notions, as developed 
in the theory of the limit of a function, seems to me singularly unenlight-
ening. Not that the function cannot be determined in terms of the notion 
limit', but that the notion 'limit' is as foreign to the classical notions of 
`addition' and 'multiplication' as is the function to be determined. The 
use of three dots ' to indicate infinite series, as in 
lira 
1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + /8 +. . . = 2, 
or the use of phrases such as 'for every number e > 0' in the definitions 
of 'limit of a function', seems to me to cover a multitude of sins (in the 
sense that new notions are being advanced under the guise of being older 
ones). In my judgment, the only satisfactory way of approaching the 
notion of 'limit' is thru the notion of the differentiation-integration 
funtion (e.g., as used to determine 'extrema' of functions, etc.), and not 
the reverse.) 
10. 
In this paper, I shall use the terms 'define' and 'determine' synony-
mously. Thus, to speak of a number being 'defined by a function' is to 
say that a number is being 'determined by a function', and likewise for 
all things not readily understood as numbers. In general, I think, I shall 
prefer to use the word 'determine', for it is etymologically related to 
the noun 'term' (e.g.,to determine `to specify a term for'), and hence 
connotes the process of giving a new name to something already under-
stood. It is in this sense that the numerals '1', '2', '3', etc., are construed 
to be new names (terms) for the functions by which the numbers are 
determined. To define a number, then, is to determine it by giving the 
function whose name it will be, and by whom it is said to be determined. 
6. It was mentioned earlier that a random series of numbers is not a 
series without specified order, but rather without specified function. For 
example, the number series 
(I) 1, 1, 3, 12, 2, 7, 9, . . . 
possesses a definite order, in that it begins with a one, followed by a one, 
followed by a three, followed by a twelve, etc. What the series does not 
prima facie possess is a general function in virtue of which each member 
of the series is determined by any other number in the series (in the sense 
that, given any number of the series, there does not prima facie exist a 
function in virtue of which the following, or preceding, number (s) can be 
determined). In contrast, the series 
( II ) 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, . . . 
not only is ordered but is also determined prima facie by the function 
notatible as 
n+ 
in the sense that, given any number of the series as n, the following num-
ber can be specified by adding two to it (and the preceding number speci-
fied by subtracting two from it). 
It can be proven algebraically, however, that any finite integral series 
of numbers possesses an unlimited number of functions in virtue of which 
the members of the series are determined. Thus, although the function or 
functions which determines the members of the first series (I) above remains 
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unknown to us, and therefore the series prima facie is without a deter-
mining function, such a function does exist. Randomness, therefore, 
does not mean without function, but without specified (or evident) 
function. 
Perhaps the matter can be shown more clearly by noticing that a 
series of non-random numbers is non-random because each member of 
the series in turn can be determined from the series of natural numbers 
by a function. For example, to say that series II above is determined 
by the function n + 2 is to assume that it makes sense to speak of adding 
two to each member of the series in turn, where 'adding two to n' is 
defined in terms of the series of natural numbers whose order is taken 
as given. If we did not first know that 5 + 2 = 7, it would make no sense 
to speak of the number 7 in series II as having been determined by the 
function n + 2 from the number 5. But we can only know that 5 + 2 = 7 
by having firstly taken the ordered series of natural. numbers 
(III) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . 
as given (and hence non-random), and having secondly defined the func-
tion (of functions) 'addition' in terms of it. Given this, series II can be 
defined as that series whose members are determined in turn by the members 
of the series of natural numbers III according to the function: 
n + (n-1) 
That is, applying the above function to the members of the series of natural 
numbers III in turn yields the members of series II in turn, as a quick check 
by substitution will indicate. 
To have said, therefore, that series II was determined by the function 
n + 2 was simply shorthand for saying that series II was determined from 
series III by the function n + (n-1). And to have said that series I was prima 
facie undetermined was shorthand for saying that there is no specified func-
tion analagous to n + (n — 1) by which series I can be determined from the 
members in turn of the series of natural numbers III. 
(There is no mathematical reason, of course, why series I could not 
have been taken as given (hence as non-random), operations akin to 
`addition' defined in terms of it, and series III declared to be prima facie 
random relative to series I. The important thingis the definition of the 
operation 'addition', of course, for any two series for which an equivalent 
operation could be defined would be identical (i.e.,the differences would 
12. 
be purely notational); and thus, if the addition operation were defined 
for series I, the series would be identical with the series we now express 
by the numerals '1', '2', '3', '4', etc. (i.e.,the series of natural numbers 
III). 
What must be noticed from the above is that the order of anything depends 
upon the existence of something by which it is functionally determined. To 
say that something is ordered is to say that it possesses a metric, a yard-
stick, by which the relative position of any part of the thing to any other 
part can be known, for having a metric is the result of being functionally 
determined from something taken as ordered (i.e. as functionally determined). 
It was argued earlier that the differentiation-integration function 
determines itself — a notion quite beyond the capacity of the dyadic (i.e. 
two-place, subject-predicate) meaning structure of English to express. It 
is the contention of this paper that works of art, being (and hence being 
determined by) such functions, must possess an intrinsic metric, in the 
sense that they are their own functional determinants, and, hence, carry 
with them the yardstick consisting of their elements-in-order in virtue of 
which the function of each element in that order can be measured. 
7. In determining the natural numbers above, it was assumed that the 
multiplication-division function was already in hand. That is, the natural 
numbers were defined in terms of the notion of multiplication-division , 
not the reverse (as is customarily the case in mathematics texts). This 
procedure can be justified, on my account, if and only if the multiplication-
division function can itself be determined by the differentiation-integration 
function which I consider as basic, for, if this can be done, the above use of 
the multiplication-division function was, as intended, a notational shortcut 
for a much longer (and less familiar) expression using only the notation of 
the differentiation-integration function. 
Although I shall not attempt to show in detail how the multiplication-
division function can be shown to be determined by the differentiation-
integration function, I shall sketch briefly how the determination could be 
carried out. 
That multiplication and division are extensions of (i.e.,determinable 
by) addition and substraction, in the ordinary sense of the words, is familiar 
to all. Assuming the same, if it can be shown that the addition-subtraction 
function can be determined by the differentiation-integration function, the 
fact that the multiplication-division function can likewise be determined 
will be considered proven. The task, then, is to show how the addition-
subtraction function is determined by the differentiation-integration function. 
13. 
The fundamental theorem of the calculus, discovered independently 
by Newton and Leibnitz, can be stated (in customary terms) as follows: 
If a function f is continuous (the meaning of 'continuous' I shall not 
discuss here) in a closed interval, then:3
(1) the function f has anti-derivatives in this interval; and 
(2) if F is any anti-derivative of f, and a and b are numbers 
within the interval, then Ib F(b)—FC
`s') and 'b' in the expression above stand for numbers. On my account, 
however, numbers are a particular kind of unction. Thus, I shall evaluate 
the symbol 
b 
as the definite integral of f evaluated from function a to function b, 
leaving it unspecified as to whether or not the functions are natural 
numbers. (That is, a and b are to be understood as functions determined 
by the differentiation-integration function). With this proviso, I can 
determine the difference between two functions, a and (3, as follows: 
def 
a = the definite integral of the derivative of 
F evaluated from a to b, where F is any 
function which, when applied to functions 
a and b, yields F(a) = (3 and F(b) = a. 
In symbols roughly compatible with ordinary usage: 
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As mentioned earlier, the above discussion is not intended to do more 
than sketch a proposed determination of the addition-subtraction function. 
That it would require much more thought and care to be precise and non-
circular is apparent (if for no other reason than that, if a and b are natural 
numbers, then apparently the determination of the numbers a and b is 
circular in a sense I should wish to avoid). But I think the above is clear 
enough to show how the problem could be attacked, if this were a paper 
in the fundamentals of mathematics, which it isn't, and how the multi-
plication-division function can be expected to be determined by the 
differentiation-integration function. (Given that a — 0 can be determined 
as above for any functions a and 13, then 
pb 
a d f (3 y, 
a 
and the multiplication-division function, of course, can be determined 
from the above as a special case of the addition-subtraction function. 
For example, if in customary terms 0 should equaltrb y, then a = + = 
the double of (3, etc.) a
8. I shall say no more about the particular mathematical notions involved 
in this paper, much less take the time to clarify the functional relation-
ships which exist between the notions already mentioned. I do this for 
two reasons: (a) such an examination would lead me too far from the 
main course of this thesis; and (b), I am as yet unable to clarify for my-
self the precise relationships involved (and expect that a detailed notation 
would be necessary to accomplish a further understanding). 
From the discussion so far, however, I think it should be apparent 
that I maintain: 
(a) To be is to be a function (i.e.,to determine other functions 
and be determined by a function); 
(b) To be a function is to be a number. 
In English, (a) could be paraphased with fair accuracy as follows: To be 
is to have a function. Ordinary linguistic usage shows a curious reflection 
of the above thesis in our tendency to ask about an object 'What is its 
function?', meaning 'What's its purpose?' or 'What does it do?' To ask 
for the function of an object in ordinary life is to ask how it is determined 
within a particular context of use, and we have all received the answer at 
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one time of another, 'It doesn't do anything', meaning within the context 
of the purposes under discussion, that the object doesn't exist (i.e. that it 
is irrelevant that it be there or not). Indeed, strictly speaking, if we use 
the context of purposes under discussion as the only possible focal point 
of the adverb 'where', the object isn't anywhere at all (i.e. it serves no 
function), and, as Gorgias pointed out circa 400 B. C., to be nowhere is 
not to be. 
If, then, I equate being (a function) with being a number, by the 
expedient of defining all numbers as those things determined by any 
function, I have taken a long road back to a position advanced by another 
Greek circa 400 B. C., Pythagoras, when he maintained that everything was 
a number. 
And that it not be misunderstood, let me put it explicitly: I am not 
playing word-games here. Anything which is can be defined, in the sense 
of being determined by a function. What it is depends upon the function 
which determines it. And functions are defined to be numbers (though, 
of course, not all functions are natural numbers). 
As I shall discuss later, a work of art is a function which determines 
its own elements. To be an element of a work of art is to have a function 
(i.e. to be determined by the function which is the work). Not to be a 
function in a work of art is to be artistically irrelevant (i.e. to be artisti-
cally nonexistent), and a work is artistic to the extent it contains no 
irrelevant elements. 
9. The English language (indeed, any natural language) is subject-predicate 
in form, with variations on the theme. That it is adequate for expressing 
the functions of ordinary life in most instances is not to be denied, but 
that it ought to be taken as the standard of clarity for deciding whether 
any notion is clear seems at best suspect, particularly when its inability 
to express complex relations is considered. 
I have spoken above, in English, of the differentiation-integration 
function, meaning that notion which can only be expressed in English as 
the conjunction of two notions: 
(1)ff=F+c dF = f 
(2) j as f = F (b) — F (a) 
That this notion cannot be adequately expressed in English becomes apparent 
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when one attempts to speak of what a 'function' is, for to say that a 
function is anything which is determinable by the differentiation-integra-
tion function is to be circular in one's argument. Yet to speak of functions 
in general without regarding the differentiation-integration relationship as 
a function, indeed as the determining function of all functions including 
itself, is to miss the point. (It should be apparent from the last sentence 
that the logician's dodge of a metalanguage-object language distinction, 
in which the former is used to speak of the latter, will be of no avail 
here. The basic function, as basic function, does determine itself.) 
In short, the English language cannot express a triadic relationship 
except as a succession of dyadic relationships (og.,`x is left of y', 'y is left 
of z', and 'z is left of x'). Nor can a mathematics which is based upon a 
notion of triadic relationships as conjunctions of dyadic ones suffice to 
determine triadic functions (witness the inability of physicists to solve 
the Three-Body problem, as discussed below). 
Yet the notion of the differentiation-integration function, as I con-
ceive it, is essentially polyadic, in the sense that functions are determined 
by at least two other functions: the function to which they are related 
by the covering function, and the covering function itself. Thus, the in-
tegral of a function F is not determined solely by the nature of the function 
F, but also by the nature of the differentiation-integration function which 
orders them both. 
The English language, in virtue of its subject-predicate meaning 
structure, is equally restricted in its ability to describe polyadic functions 
constituting works of art. Any element of a work of art is determined by 
every other element of the work, not only in the sense that it exists in 
specifiable relationships to every other element, and they to each other 
and it (a set of dyadic relationships), but in the sense that, if it were other 
than it is, the relationship between any other two elements would be diff-
erent from what it is. That is, it is precisely correct to say of any element 
in a work of art that it is functionally determined by all the other elements 
in the work, but also that it functionally determines the function of all the 
other elements in the work. 
Perhaps a physical analogue will make the point clearer. Newton 
proved that the mass of the earth (M) could be considered as concentrated 
in a point at its center for purposes of describing the gravitational effect 
of the mass of the earth upon objects (masses) at varying distances from 
its surface (discounting the effects of the sun, etc.). He did this by using 
the new techniques of the calculus (integration). Thus, he was able to 
describe how the gravitational effect on a particle of mass p would lessen 
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as it moved further from earth. 
.1•11=1,
P 
Newton was able to do this because the relationship between the particles 
of mass making up the earth's mass remain invariant regardless of the posi-
tion of mass p relative to them. That is, the relationship of particles mi  to 
m2 of the earth's mass determines the variable gravitational effect on parti-
cle p regardless of its distance from them, but particle p, regardless of its 
distance, could effect no change on the relationship between particles m, 
and m2 . Since all particles of the earth's mass are in the same situation, 
Newton was able to integrate the result and treat the problem of gravitation 
as essentially a two-body, rather than a many-body, problem. Had the 
motion of particle p been significant in altering the relationship between 
particles m, and m2 , however, the integration could not have been effected, 
for there was (and is) no known way of determining polyadic functions 
which cannot be described as conjunctions of dyadic functions. 
That is, conceive of three bodies related in such a fashion that the 
action of any one of them affects the motion of both of the other two non-
identically. (The situation is the same as if, in the diagram above, a change 
of position in particle p were to effect a change in the positions of m, and 
m2 relative to each other.) It is impossible, under these circumstances in 
general, to specify a function which correctly describes the overall activity 
which would result if one or all of the members of the system were dis-
placed in some manner. Various approximation techniques have been 
devised to enable physicists to work with such systems, and solutions to 
severely restricted versions of the three-body (and n > 3 - body) problem 
have been given by Lagrange, Poincare, etc. But the fact remains that no 
general solution to the problem of three or more bodies exists; and the 
work of Poincare has shown that a general solution, if found, would have 
to involve functions which are neither algebriac nor uniform — and no one 
knows, given the classical definition of 'function', what that could even mean. 
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The problem of describing polyadic functions, therefore, goes right 
to the root of contemporary mathematical thought, and, given the essen-
tially dyadic determination of functions now current, is apparently un-
solvable. (The procedures used to deal with such systems in the physical 
world (for they exist all about us) are approximation techniques deter-
mined by extending the notion of classes of dyadic functions to their 
limits (e.g.,limits of series, etc.).) 
It is no wonder, therefore, that the English language, with its subject-
predicate meaning structure (essentially a dyadic function) has been found 
incapable of expressing precisely the patterns of functions constituting 
works of art, no matter how fluent the author or how careful the exposi-
tion. The fault does not lie in the inability of men to use their languages 
precisely enough, but rather in the structural inability of the languages 
themselves to be capable of such expression. An essentially dyadic func-
tion cannot describe an essentially polyadic (more-than-two) function, 
for it lacks the structural means of conveying that which is essential in 
the latter. 
Each element of a work of art does not exist in a context determined 
by the other elements alone, therefore, but in a context partially deter-
mined by its own presence. That is, if an element x should exist in the 
context of the work of art in a particular functional relationship to elements 
y and z, and they in turn to each other, substitution of element w for x 
would not only change the relationship between that element and elements 
y and z, but would also change the functional relationship determining y 
and z themselves. 
Particular examples from the arts could be multiplied indefinitely to 
illustrate the above, though I think two will suffice. The function deter-
mining the two pitches constituting an interval of the augmented fourth 
changes depending on the musical context in which they are heard (as any 
modern textbook discussion of the 'triton& will emphasize). 
(a `tritone) 
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The musical context, of course, consists of other pitches existing in 
various functional roles relative to the pitches of the tritone. Thus, a 
change in any one (or, more blatantly, any combination) of the con-
textual pitches would not only change the context in which the tritone 
is heard, but would also change the functional relationship existing be-
tween the pitches constituting the tritone. (The very habit of some theor-
ists, bespeaking a particular harmonic tradition, of referring to the various 
pitches in this frequency relationship by one term, 'augmented fourth', or 
`tritone', regardless of the functional relationship involved within the con-
text of the work, and the resulting lack of compositional pertinance of 
such analysis, has regrettably lessened the interest of active composers in 
the results of the search for whatever genuine physiological determinants 
of artistic measure there may be. E.g.,the works of Helmholtz in particular.) 
Similarly, the placing of a particular shot rather than another after 
two given shots in a film not only would effect a different functional rela-
tionship between the first two shots and the third, but also would effect 
a change in the functional relationship determining the first two shots 
themselves. That is, how one would take the first two shots themselves 
would depend upon the nature of the third, while how one would take the 
third shot would depend upon the nature of the first two. (Again I point 
out: although my account is intentionally circular, the circularity is the 
result of attempting to describe an essentially polyadic function by a com-
bination of dyadic functions (sentences). To those who would say 'So 
much the worse for art', I reply 'So much the worse for sentences', and 
go on about the business at hand.) 
10. I have argued that the structural nature of English (or any other nat-
ural language) is such that no general analysis of the patterns of art is pos-
sible within the language, for the latter involve polyadic functions essen-
tially while the former is limited in virtue of its dyadic meaning structure 
to the description of complexes of dyadic functions. 
Logic, of course, began as the study of the formal characteristics of 
natural languages; and the symbolic logics of today, developments of the 
former, have increased the scope of complexity over which the logical analy-
ses of dyadic functions hold. But, as I have futher indicated above, it is 
hardly accidental that the mathematical functions upon which contemporary 
physics are constructed, i.e., those functions which have been reduced to 
logical notation by Russell, Whitehead, Quine, et. al., are inadequate to 
determine any situation which involves more than a complex of dyadic 
functions (e.g.,the Three-Body problem in particular, and polyadic functions 
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in general). 
The upshot of the preceding discussions, consequently, is that neither 
English (nor any other natural language) nor mathematics, as currently 
understood, are adequate to the description of those polyadic functions 
which are the essential determinants of a work of art. That is, although 
the pragmatic success of approximation techniques (and I include proba-
bility 'functions' under this heading) gives good reason for maintaining 
that such functions are certainly in effect, they cannot now be expressed 
in mathematical notation for they remain undiscovered (i.e. unknown). 
Simply put, the mathematical foundations of artistic functions are, at 
present, unthinkable (i.e.,conceptually unconstructed), and will remain 
thus until a major mathematical advance is achieved: the solution in 
general to the problem of polyadic functions. 
A corollary of the above, of course, is that no notational system de-
rived from a mathematical notational system can be adequate to the ex-
pression of even the simplest functions of a work of art, for even the 
simplest functions are essentially triadic and hence beyond the scope of 
mathematics as it is presently conceived (i.e.,as an extension of the com-
plex dyadic functions of logic, which are in turn derived from the subject-
predicate meaning structure of the natural languages). As approximation 
techniques are technologically effective in describing the physical world, 
however, and as music has had a fairly workable notation based on such 
a technique for several centuries, one might hope that such a technique 
might be developed for the cinema despite the lack of a mathematical 
foundation for art in general. (And, as we shall see, such is the case.) 
The fact that approximation techniques have been developed in 
mathematical physics to deal with the problem of 3-or-more bodies, and 
that such techniques are effective, gives credence to the assumption that 
the activities of 3-or-more bodies are functionally determined though the 
function is not now known and hence cannot be expressed (it is apparent 
that something beyond the classical meaning of the word 'function', though 
including it as a special case, is intended here, as previously explained). 
Notice, to say that the function determining the activities of 3-or-
more bodies cannot be expresses is not to say that the activities cannot be 
expressed. If, for example, three bodies, x, y, and z should be moving in 
a one dimensional space such that, for any time t, the position of any one 
of the three bodies relative to a zero position can be specified, a graph of 
the relative positions of the three bodies against time might appear as 
follows: 
21. 
(z 
Position 
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To be able to produce such a graph (or its equivalent), however, is not to be 
able, in general, to produce the function which determines why the positions 
of the 3 bodies graphed against time are as they are. In particular, even 
though it is possible to graph the positions of 3-or-more mutually inter-
acting bodies against time, it is in general impossible (given the present 
state of mathematical knowledge) to specify a function by which the rela-
tive positions of the bodies are determined. For many utilitarian purposes, 
however, lack of knowledge of such a function is relatively unimportant, 
for the presence of a graph of the positions provides sufficient information 
despite lack of functionality to accomplish the purpose at hand. 
The nature, purpose, and effectiveness of musical scores provides a 
striking example within the world of art of the above. What is required of 
a musical score is that it provide the performer with information sufficient 
to enable him to produce at the appropriate times the appropriate sounds. 
The fact that he cannot express the function determining the sounds in that 
order, and that the score does not express it (in precisely the same sense in 
which the above graph of the positions of the 3 bodies does not express the 
function determining them), is not a devasting handicap to musical produc-
tion anymore than the lack of knowledge of a general solution to the prob-
lem of n-bodies handicaps astrophysicists in their launching of satellites 
into prescribed orbits, and for the same reason: it is the composer of the 
musical work and the creator of the universe who must have been essentially 
concerned with the function determining the positions of the sounds and 
satellites respectively, not the performers of (or within) the work. (I am, of 
course, using the phrase 'creator of the universe' as a metaphoric analogue 
to the subject 'composer' — and in no other sense.) 
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The assumption that the universe is functionally determined (i.e. has 
`unity', in Sciama's reparsing of Mach's principle)4 , is an empirical hypoth-
esis awaiting confirmation like any other. The existence of effective approxi-
mation techniques provides evidence confirming the assumption. In the same 
sense, the existence of effective musical scores provides evidence confirming 
the assumption that the elements of a musical work are functionally deter-
mined, even though the function cannot be expressed (for exactly the same 
reasons, I have argued, that the functions determining n-bodies cannot pres-
ently be expressed). 
But a musical work differs in one important sense from the universe 
vis a vis our perspective as human beings, for it is possible to say in the 
former case precisely where the focal point of responsibility for being aware 
that a function does determine a musical work lies, even though that func-
tion cannot be expressed by him or anyone else. The responsibility rests on 
the-composer of the work. And that it is a responsibility, in the sense that 
the function determining their works exists as an objective against which 
their works are to be measured even though it cannot be named (i.e. expres-
sed as the subject of sentences), has been consistently maintained by the 
greatest of composers, Bach thru Beethoven to Stravinsky, in the face of 
consistently naive, careless, and pretentious arguments against the reason-
ableness of this attitude. I have given my reasons above for holding that 
the lack of means of expression is mathematical in nature, and hence prob-
ably temporary. To those who still wish to maintain that whatever cannot 
be the subject of sentences cannot be taken seriously (for it really isn't), I 
say: Bach took it seriously in the Goldberg Variations, as did Beethoven, 
et. al., in their works, and their testimony, given the evidence of their works, 
strikes me as somewhat more relevant to understanding their works than 
protests without payoff. To invert a phrase of St. Paul: "Faith without 
evidence is misunderstanding." 
11. I wish to stress the difference between the notion of art and mathe-
matics being presented in this paper and a contrary notion sometimes 
advanced in similar terminology. 
It is sometimes a matter of dispute between rival groups of artists 
or critics whether or not art embodies mathematics. Although one can 
only guess at the meaning of the word 'embody' when used in such.con-
texts, the polemics in general seem either to be directed at, or to issue 
from, those individuals who wish to maintain that there is a world of 
mathematical relationships which exists in some sense apart from the 
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phenomenal world of things, colors, sounds, feelings, etc., and that art-
objects differ from things of the phenomenal world in that they are struc-
tured so that their patterns of colors, shapes, sounds, etc., become instances 
of these mathematical relationships. 
Perhaps the crucial difference between the above view and that advan-
ced in this paper can be put in the turn of a phrase: on their view, works of 
art embody mathematical relationships; on my view, works of art (like every-
thing else) are mathematical relationships. 
It will be recalled that 'numbers' ( the subjects of mathematical prop-
ositions in the classical view of mathematics) were defined above as func-
tions of the differentiation-integration function, where the letter 'x' stood 
for anything (be it colors, sounds, feelings, or even the function itself) 
determined by the function so defined. (The circularity of the definition 
was noted, and applauded, in passing.) To the extent that colors and 
sounds can be functioned (in a sense, given in patterns), on this account, 
they are numbers; and hence, in the classical sense, the work of art is a 
mathematical proposition (function). 
The difference between the world about us and a work of art is not 
that the latter embodies mathematical relationships while the former does 
not, but rather that a work of art exists as functionally determined (though 
we cannot express the function), while, no matter how broad our sense of 
the functional determination of the facets of the world about us, there al-
ways exists facets which do not seem to be determined by any function. 
To the extent that the world about us is seen as functionally determined 
(e.g.,as by Jesus, Aquinas, Newton, Einstein, Weyl, Schrodinger, etc.), it is 
seen as a work of art, and it is a mathematical function. 
(The curious distinction found in English grammar which permits a 
work of art, unlike a sentence, to be 'true to life' but not 'true of life's 
supports the position taken above, in the sense that: the function determin-
ing a work of art is less complex than that of the world (if such there be), 
although there are aspects of the world which can be seen as determined by 
the same function as the work of art if we choose to neglect the aspects not 
so determined; the work of art may then be said to be 'true to life'. But 
this is so only because we have chosen to restrict the aspects of the world 
under consideration. There is no similar restriction on the aspects of the 
world in saying 'This pencil is black', for the procedure of designating and 
classifying does not entail that I consider the world as bounded by the 
measuring device of the proposition I assert. That is, I do not thereby dis-
regard other aspects of the world by asserting a true (of life) proposition; 
I simply don't assert them. A work of art, in contrast, is true (to life) only 
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to the extent that the world is seen (or felt) as being exhaustively deter-
mined (i.e.,bounded) by the same function which determines the work 
of art.) 
12. The composer of music, or any work of art, cannot be said to know 
the function which determines his work of art, for the function cannot be 
expressed, only sensed. It is for this reason that the training of a composer 
consists essentially in two activities, neither one of which is equivalent to 
acquiring knowledge of the sort detailed in textbooks on harmony, count-
erpoint, etc. 
(a) Examining compositions of other composers; and 
(b) Composing works of his own. 
Theories of harmony and counterpoint maybe useful to the composer, not 
because they can provide him with a knowledge of the functions of his art 
(for no such knowledge is mathematically possible at present), but rather 
because they may provide him (1) with a rich and familiar vocabulary in 
which to couch the insights into function (i.e.,awareness of function) which 
he derives from an examination of the compositions of others and himself, 
and (2) because they often provide him with sources of examples and exer-
cises thru which he can develop his functional sense. 
There are two principal dangers in speaking as I have of 'awareness', 
`insight', 'functional sense', etc. Firstly, there is a tendency among some to 
equate acting upon awareness with acting irrationally, in the sense of acting 
emotionally (i.e. by force of habit) or non-cognitively (i.e.,without regard 
to evidence). To act upon awareness, however, is not to act irrationally but 
to act non-rationally (i.e.,to act `unratioed', in the classical Greek and mathe-
matical sense — to act without knowing of any general premise from which 
the particular act can be deduced). Neither Bach nor Einstein acted irration-
ally in composing their thoughts and works, though both surely acted non-
rationally. 
Secondly, and closely tied to the first, there is a tendency among some 
to equate acting upon awareness with acting without preparation (i.e. with-
out time-consuming methods of evaluation and measurement, or without 
critical judgment). The notebooks of the greatest artists refute the conten-
tion that this is, in fact, how composers (not now referring only to compos-
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ers of music) have worked. And the fact that the greatest composers have 
been students of composers, and hence that the craft not only can but must 
be learned, refutes the contention that functional insight is not the product 
of extreme effort, perseverance, and work. Newton did not discover the 
laws of gravitation by being hit in the head by an apple, though he may have 
been hit in the head by an apple while discovering the laws of gravitation. 
At that moment, any number of events would have triggered the crucial 
insight; without the preparation, none would have. 
Although a composer cannot hope for a notational system which 
will express the function determining his work of art (for such a function 
can only be sensed at present, not expressed), is it the case that some meth-
ods of creation are more likely than others to make evident to the composer 
whether or not the work in progress is being functionally determined, and 
to what degree? If the evidence of teaching methods of the great artists is 
an acceptable clue, the answer seems to be 'yes'. Painters often teach their 
students to block-out sections of the canvas, or turn the canvas upside-down, 
to destroy natural prejudices of vision which may be hindering the function-
al sense. Musical composition majors, exercising in counterpoint or harmony, 
are often told to check each voice against the others individually so that any 
discrepancy from the functional norm (here specified by rules) can be noted 
and corrected immediately. The point of these exercises is not to teach the 
student rules, but to give him practice in sensing functionally which will 
serve him well in later years when no rules can explicitly be formulated. 
Diverse as the teaching methods of the arts may seem to be at first 
glance, all are engaged in articulating a simple admonition to their students: 
(a) Learn to sense which of the elements of your 
ideas are more functional within particular 
contexts than others; and 
(b) Learn to sense when a weaker.element can be 
replaced by a functionally stronger element 
in context. 
By constantly being forced to compare and contrast elements in context 
with genuine alternatives, and to judge their functional value, the student 
is being given practice in sensing functionally. 
From this clue it can surely be seen that the most advantageous nota-
tional system for a working composer would be one which combines a means 
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of expressing the elements (and hence contexts) of his ideas with maximum 
clarity with a means of comparing and contrasting elements in context with 
maximum flexibility. Only within such a system could the ideas of a com-
poser be developed and expanded to their full functional value. 
Every major composer has developed his own method of composition, 
some using notebooks, others scraps of paper, sketch pads, etc. The method 
I shall outline in Section III of this paper, though peculiar in its details to 
the problems of film composition, could be extended in its essentials to any 
other art, and seems to me to possess advantages of clarity and flexibility to 
the composer far beyond the methods indicated above. 
But first a necessary digression awaits us, for as yet the elemental 
functions of the cinema have not been discussed. 
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Section II: On the limits of Cinematic Space 
I. As indicated above, to be in order (i.e.,to be ordered) is to be determined 
by a function from a given function taken as defining what 'order' is to mean. 
To be random, in contrast, is to be unordered by any specified function 
relative to a given function taken as the standard of order. 
For ease of speaking informally, let me use a noun-word to designate 
any function taken as given (i.e.,as the standard of order) in virtue of 
which the ordering of other series may be functionally determined. Such 
a function, which I shall call a space, is taken as given in the sense that it 
is considered as undetermined by any specified function, and hence is the 
standard of order for all other functions. To paraphrase T. S. Eliot, a space 
is where one starts from. 
This section is concerned with examining a particular space and the 
functions determinable with respect to it: the cinematic space. Just as 
numbers were determined above as functions of the differentiation-integra-
tion space, so the concepts which usually are discussed in film theory (color, 
shape, motion, dramaturgy, rhythm, etc.) must be functions determinable 
with respect to the basic cinematic function. (Just as numbers were deter-
mined to be those functions which were determined by the addition and 
multiplication functions, which in turn were determined by the space of 
differentiation-integration, so the aspects of contemporary theory of the 
cinema are functions of functions . . . of the cinematic space.) 
The notion of the cinematic space cannot be expressed non-circularly 
anymore than the notion of the differentiation-integration space. As I 
have argued, the tendency to attempt to define the latter in terms of 
numbers was misconstrued, for it is the latter in virtue of which numbers 
ought to be defined. However, this is not to say that one learns of the 
differentiation-integration space prior to learning of numbers; one learns 
of one in learning of the other. (Although to say that 'learning elementary 
arithmetic is learning the calculus' may seem strange, the strangeness 
seems to me to arise from a misconception of what numbers and the cal-
culus are.) Similarly, one learns of the cinematic space while learning about 
colors and sounds and movements, etc., for it is by exercising with these 
elements that one develops one's functional sense relative to the cinematic 
space. 
Thus, just as the elements of arithmetic are numbers defined as 
functions of the differentiation-integration space, and just as the budding 
arithmetician develops his functional sense by playing with numbers, so 
the elements of a film are color-relations and sound-relations defined as 
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functions of functions of . . . the cinematic space, and the budding 
cineaste develops his functional sense by playing with color-relations and 
sound-relations. 
(I shall assume without discussion that color-relations and sound-
relations are distinct in the sense that, although a functionally determined 
color-relation would be modified by the substitution of one color for an-
other within any context, it makes no sense to speak of a functionally 
determined color-relation being modified by the substitution of one sound 
for another within a context functionally determining both colors and 
sounds.) 
Colors and sounds (the terms will often henceforth be used as abbrevi-
ations for polyadic color-relations (color-functions) and polyadic sound-
relations (sound-functions)) can be determined by an unlimited number 
of functions of functions of . . . the cinematic space, just as numbers them-
selves can be determined by innumerable functions. In the history of the 
art, certain of these functions (of functions, etc.) have tended to predomin-
ate for one reason or another, to the extent that fairly significant names 
have been given to these families of functions of colors and sounds: 'dra-
matic', 'documentary', 'comic', 'poetic', etc. A dramatic, or documentary, 
etc., film is a film having a certain kind of form; that is, it is a combination 
of colors and sounds determined by a certain familiar function (of func-
tions of . . .) of the cinematic space rather than some others. By playing 
with colors and sounds, and arranging them so that they are determined 
by one such family of functions rather than others, the student develops 
his functional sense relative to this family of functions of the cinematic 
space. And, in a society where it is profitable to make films only in accor-
dance with one or another of these families, there is much to be said for 
developing predominantly this sort of sense in the student. 
But the fact that these families of functions constitute just one part 
of the functional spectrum of the cinematic space leads me to ask: what 
are the limits on colors and sounds in terms of the cinematic space in 
general? That is, what are the limits on the functional possibilities of the 
cinematic space? 
It is at this point that the analogy between the cinematic space and 
the differentiation-integration space becomes useless. For if everything 
is a number, as argued above, than the cinematic space itself is but a function 
of functions of . . . the differentiation-integration space. That no limits can 
be set upon the differentiation-integration space is apparent, for there is 
nothing apart from itself in virtue of which it cannot be measured: it is the 
fundamental standard of order in virtue of which all functions are to be 
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judged, including itself. But, although the cinematic space exists only as it 
determines and is determined by its functions (like the differentiation-inte-
gration space), if it could none-the-less be taken, not as a space, but as the 
function of another space whose limits we either know or take as given, its 
own limits could then be measured (i.e.,shown) functionally. 
And there seems adequate evidence that the cinematic space need not 
be taken as a space, but can be evaluated (i.e.,taken as a function determined 
by) the space of experimental psychology. Thus, it is likely that certain 
limitations of the cinematic function can be recognized by considering the 
known limits of the space of experimental psychology. I shall consider the 
limitations on the cinematic functioning of colors and sounds in the follow-
ing discussion in this sense. 
The contemporary viewpoint of experimental psychology on perceptual 
colors and sounds may be summarized as follows: 
A. Colors. 
As the work of Munsell, Ostwald, and others have shown, all perceptual 
color-functions can be expressed as functions of points in a 3-dimensional 
color solid having value as its vertical dimension, chroma as its radial dimen-
sion, and hue as its circumferential dimension. 
Blue 
Green 
Red 
Yellow 
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Hue is that quality of difference in color-points which we usually designate 
by labeling one 'red' rather than 'yellow' or 'green', etc. Chroma is that 
quality of difference in color-points which we usually designate by calling 
one 'purer' or 'more vivid' or 'more saturated' than the other. (As is evi-
dent from the diagram, chroma is a measure of a color-point's distance 
from the achromatic axis of the greys, a measure of its chromaticity or 
relative chromatic-ness.) Value is that quality of difference in color-points 
which we usually designate by calling one 'brighter' or 'less dark' than an-
other (in Ostwald's phrase, a measure of how much 'black' or 'white' a 
color-point contains). 
There is an intrinsic metric in the perceptual color solid in this sense: 
The hues located diametric to each other in the solid are complementary 
in that, when mixed in proper proportions on a Maxwell color-wheel 
rotating rapidly, they blend to achromatic grey. Given any complementary 
pair of hues as measuring points, it is always possible to determine percep-
tually whether or not two color-points chosen at random are on the same 
or opposite sides of the hue circle as divided by the complementary pair, 
to determine to which member of the complementary pair each color-point 
is closest, and also, if both are on the same side, to determine which is 
closer to either member of the complementary pair. Similarly, given any 
plane perpendicular to the value line as a reference, it is always possible 
to determine perceptually whether the value-planes of two color-points 
chosen at random are on the same or opposite sides of the value space as 
divided by the reference plane. Similarly, given any cylinder of points 
having equal chroma as reference, it is always possible to determine percep-
tually whether the chroma-cylinders of two color-points chosen at random 
are on the same or opposite sides (inside or outside) of the chroma space 
as divided by the reference cylinder. (I am, of course, assuming that all 
differences given above do not fall below the threshold levels of perceptual 
discrimination.) 
If, as was indicated earlier, to be ordered (i.e.,to have a metric) is to be 
functionally determined, the perceptual color solid must be functionally 
determined. But by what function? Although traditional mind-matter 
distinctions would lead us to consider both the human perceiver and the 
physical world as joint determining functions of the color solid, and al-
though the present state of bio-physical research into the nature of percep-
tion is inconclusive, the evidence seems to suggest that the preponderance 
of the function must be determined by the nature of the physical stimulus. 
At the very least, the human perceiver cannot perceive more metrical variety 
in the color-solid than is made available in the stimulus. (i. e.,the mind can-
not create a greater variety in the colors it perceives than there exists in the 
stimulus.) Indeed, in the case of color (and sound) the evidence suggests a 
very close isomorphism between the metrical variety of the physical stimu-
lus and that of the color solid. For most practical purposes, therefore, the 
space of experimental psychology vis a vis color-perception can be taken, 
not as a space, but as a (logarithmic) function of the physical space. In the 
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case of color, if one considers the usual diagram of the electro-magnetic 
spectrum for visible light (with the horizontal axis converted from the 
metric of 'wavelength' to that of `frequency'), 
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whenever equal amounts of energy are present at all frequencies, the re-
sulting light is seen as achromatic. Thus, diagrammatically, an energy line 
parallel to the frequency axis indicates an achromatic perceptual stimulus. 
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The relative height of an energy line parallel to the frequency axis, therefore, 
indicates roughly the same perceptual situation as is measured on the value 
,scale of the perceptual color-solid. 
As the spectrum color at each frequency is, by definition, the most 
saturated color possible at that frequency, a single vertical energy line at any 
given frequency would represent a source of the most saturated color possible 
at that frequency. 
 1 
Red Blue 
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As the energy line which peaks in the vicinity of any given frequency be-
comes less vertical and more horizontal, the color at that frequency becomes 
correspondingly less chromatic (i.e.,more achromatic). 
A 1 
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Thus, the relative restrictedness of the range of peak energy indicates roughly 
the same perceptual situation as is measured on the chroma scale of the per-
ceptual color solid. 
The relative position of the energy peak (or combination of peaks), of 
course, indicates roughly the same perceptual situation as is measured on the 
hue scale of the perceptual color solid, complementary hues being those 
whose energy lines, when added together, form a composite energy line paral-
lel to the frequency axis—hence achromatic. 
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B. Sounds 
The evidence of a very close isomorphism between the metrical variety 
of the physical stimulus and that of the color-solid is repeated in the case of 
sound. That is, for all practical purposes, the space of experimental psychol-
ogy vis a vis sound perception can be taken, not as a space, but as a (logarith-
mic) function of physical space. Since the notion of a sound-solid has never 
gained much headway (for reasons which will become apparent below), I 
shall firstly describe the physical stimulus, and then secondly describe the
perceptual correlates. 
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When the sound spectrum is contrasted with the spectrum of light, one 
obvious difference is apparent. The range of possible frequencies in the 
spectrum of light is a factor of less than 2 times the lowest perceivable fre-
quency (7.5 X 101 ' = 4.3 X 101 ' times < 2 (i.e.,times less than 2)), while 
that of sound is more than 21 ° times the lowest perceivable frequency 
(20,000 = 16 times > 21 ° (i.e. times more than 21° )). This difference 
is of crucial perceptual importance, and I shall speak more of it below. In 
other respects, however, the mathematical analyses of the physical 
stimuli are identical in either case. 
Whenever nearly equal amounts of energy are present at all frequencies, 
the resulting sound is called 'white noise', and is mathematically equivalent 
to the achromatic (i.e. white) light of the visible spectrum. 
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As the spectrum sound at each frequency is, by definition, the purest possi-
ble sound at that frequency, a single vertical energy line at any given fre-
quency would represent a source of the purest sound possible at that fre-
quency. 
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As the energy peak in the vicinity of any given frequency becomes less ver-
tical and more horizontal, the sound at that frequency becomes corresponding-
ly less pure (i.e.,more like 'white noise'). 
Co 20,00o 1(n 20,000 I Co 2o, 000 
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The relative position of the energy peak (or combination of peaks) to the fre-
quency axis is also determinable. 
Thus, the physical stimulus of perceptual sound provides the basis for 
at least a three-fold metrical variety of perception strictly analogous to that 
which was specified for the color-solid. And, indeed, corresponding to the 
scales of hue, value, and chroma in the color-solid, there would exist the scales 
of pitch, loudness, and purity (or clarity of pitch) in the mythical sound-solid. 
Sound, however, possesses another scale in virtue of the range of its 
frequency spectrum which light cannot possess. It was mentioned earlier 
that the range between the lowest and highest frequencies of sound varies 
by a factor of more than 2' 0 . That is, as I proceed from the lowest to the 
highest frequency along the spectrum, I encounter at least ten frequencies 
which are integral multiples of the lowest frequency (i.e.,16 cps times 2, 16 
times 3, 16 times 4, etc.), many which are integral multiples of the second 
lowest frequency (i.e. 17 times 2, 17 times 3, etc.), and so on. As the great-
er of any one of two of these frequencies contains the lesser as an integral 
factor, I ought not to be surprised that there exists in the physical stimulus 
of sound the functional basis for an additional perceptual metrical scale cor-
responding to nothing in the physical stimulus of light or the perceptual 
color-solid. That is, since no frequency in the spectrum of light can be an 
integral factor of any other, but many of the frequencies in the spectrum of 
sound are integral factors of each other, it is not surprising that the latter are 
perceived to be functionally related in a manner in which the former could 
not be. Such sets of integrally-multiple frequencies constitute the tonal fam-
ilies of pitch, and are the basis, as Helmholtz has shown, for the sensation of 
tonality (very roughly, the 'C'-ness of a pitch, or its 'A # '-ness). 
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The hearing of sounds, consequently, unlike the seeing of colors, 
involves perceiving in a dimension of the sound-space which has no correspon-
ding scale in the color-solid. The following correspondences hold for both 
perceptual colors and sounds: 
Color-solid 
Hue scale 
Value scale 
Chroma scale 
Sound-solid 
Pitch scale 
Loudness scale 
Purity scale (i.e. clarity of pitch; 
lack of noise) 
But for the tonality scale in the sound-solid, there is no corresponding scale 
in the color-solid. 
Tonality scale 
Perceptual sound-space, therefore, is four-dimensional, unlike the three-
dimensional color-solid, and does not thus lend itself easily to conceptuali-
zation as a visual model. For this reason, and because musical composers 
until recently have been relatively uninterested in the 'purity' scale of per-
ceptual sound (except as conceived pragmatically under the blurry notion of 
the respective 'timbres' of the various musical instruments), the notion of 
specifying a precise perceptual sound-solid has proved of little interest. 
Until this is accomplished, however, the hope of ever orchestrating precisely 
the sounds of locomotives and the shuffle of feet in films will remain exactly 
that: a hope. 
3. I have presented a somewhat truncated version of the contemporary 
notions of perceptual color and sound as they are conceived by experimental 
psychologists, and given a rough indication of their contemporary status as 
functions of physical space. Now I wish to indicate wherein the above ac-
count of perceptual color and sound is, if not wrong, at least sufficiently 
confusing to warrant clarification. 
That the color-solid is not a 3-dimensional space in the ordinary geo-
metrical sense of the word becomes readily apparent when it is noticed that 
the dimension of hue has no zero (or center) point. That is, the 3-dimensions 
of the color-solid are not independent of each other, for if the fact that a per-
ceived color has hue is indicated by `H*' (and likewise `C*' and `V*' for 'has 
chroma' and 'has value' respectively), and if the fact that a perceived color 
lacks hue is indicated by `H-' (and likewise `C-' and `V-' for 'has no chroma' 
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and 'has no value'), of the following eight possible combinations of hue, 
chroma, and value, 
1. H*, C*, V* 
2. H*, C*, V-
3. H*, C-, V* 
4. H*, C-, V-
5. H-, C*, V* 
6. H-, C*, V-
7. H-, C-, V* 
8. H-, C-, V-
only (1) and (8) indicate possible functions of physical space! To be per-
ceived as a color (i.e. to be visually perceived at all), a stimulus must, there-
fore, 
(a) have Value *; and 
(b) have either both Hue * and Chroma *, 
or both Hue - and Chroma - . 
Although any color may be indicated as a point in the color-solid, therefore, 
the tendency to construe the color-solid as consisting of 3 metrically inde-
pendent functions is incorrect. Hue and chroma are metrically interdependent, 
but (jointly) and metrically independent of value, in a sense which is totally 
obscured by referring to perceptual color as a function of hue, chroma, and value. 
Metrically, perceptual color would more accurately be determined as 
a function of value and chromaticity (the latter being understood as a 
measure of the increasing possibility of complementarity). 
VALUE 
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Failure to understand perceptual color in this sense may lead to serious 
inaccuracies in making choices as an artist. For example, all too many 
artists have written as if they considered whiteness and blackness to be on a 
metrical par with redness and greeness (regardless of whether or not they 
allowed this misconception in practice to affect their work). But to say that 
one color is 'whiter' than another is not to say that it is less black, but that 
it is less chromatic (i.e.,more achromatic), where 'black' is understood to be 
the relative absence of energy (relative darkness). Whiteness, thus, is not the 
absence of blackness, but of chromaticity. To be white is to be achromatic; 
to be anywhere on the scale of chromaticity (from most chromatic to achro-
matic) is to be necessarily not-black; and to be black is to be necessarily neither 
chromatic nor achromatic. As a practical example, to contrast the effect of a 
red-and-black to a green-and-black as color-functions is to judge them 
metrically as differing in relative value, not as differing in relative 
chromaticity. Chromatically speaking, black is as neutral to red as to green. 
If the circular diagram 
Red 
Yellow Blue 
Green 
is helpful in remembering what a complementary color function is (i.e. 
remembering that each complementary function automatically determines 
the metric of the elements of any other complementary function, in the 
sense that, given a complementary function, it is always possible perceptu-
ally to determine (a) whether or not two arbitrarily chosen elements of other 
complementary functions (i.e.,two hues) are on the same or opposite sides 
of the circle as divided by the poles of the given complementary function, 
(b) to which of the two poles either is closest, and (c), if both are on the same 
side of the circle, which is closer to either of the two poles), and if it is desir-
able to incorporate a graphic reminder that decreasing chromaticity means 
less and less relevance for the complementary function in the metrical struc-
ture of the perceptual color function, the above value-chromaticity 
diagram might be modified as follows: 
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Here I have simply shown graphically what the chromaticity axis metri-
cally means in terms of perceptual color: to be more chromatic is to be 
metrically more determined by the complementary function. And the 
degree of chromaticity of a color is metrically independent of its value. 
The compositional upshot of the above is that the aesthetic relevance 
of hue, by and large, has been greatly overemphasized by most persons con-
cerned with the subject. It is only when two perceptual colors are of nearly 
the same chromaticity (i.e. are at approximately the same metrical distance 
from 'white' as judged relative to a third color) that their metrical relation-
ship vis a vis the complementary function (i.e.,their hue difference) becomes 
relatively important. Or, put another way, given a perceptual color of a 
certain chromaticity, the fact that a 3rd color exists at a distance several 
times farther away on the chromaticity axis than a 2nd color is of much 
greater importance in sensing the functional color relations holding be-
tween the three colors than the fact that the 3rd is red and the first 
green. (By the same argument, the fact that the 2nd is red relative to the 
first would be of more importance than the fact that the 3rd is red relative 
to the first.) Differences in perceptual colors, therefore, are first and foremost 
determined by the metrical functions of value and chromaticity (i.e.,distance 
from 'white'), becoming functions of their hue-relations only as they metrically 
approach each other along the chromaticity axis. 
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(It is no accident that most filmmakers, faced with emulsions o c limited 
chromatic sensitivity and the necessities of projection, have resigned them-
selves to being able to operate only within a narrowly confined segment of the 
chromaticity axis, and thus to being concerned principally with hue-relations. 
But, note, it is also no accident that the most color-sensitive filmmaker of all, 
Antonioni, painted the grass and trees green in Blow-up, not to change their 
hue, but to increase their chromaticity function vis a vis the remaining colors 
in the shot(s).) 
Thruout the above discussion, of course, (in line with the notion of 
`function' as presented in Section I) it has been assumed that hues are those 
elements determined by a complementary function, chromaticities those 
elements determined by a chromaticity function, and values those elements 
determined by a value function, all in turn being determined by the (a) color-
function. That is, it is nonsense to call a color 'red' except it be functionally 
determined (i.e. related to a second color) by a complementary function which 
determines the metrical position of the second color relative to red and its 
complementary. To be 'red' is to be given as complementary to 'green', and 
to have established a metrical field in virtue of which the hue of any other 
color may be measured. It is, thus, nonsense to talk of a red-patch apart 
from the metrical field (i.e. the complementary function) which determines 
it as 'red' — i.e.,as complementary to 'green', and as existing, thus, in a deter-
mined metrical position relative to any other hue. (It is some such sense as 
this, I think, that the results of Land's experiments will be ultimately explain-
ed.)6 
4. An analysis similar in most respects to that given above for color-functions 
can also be made for sound-functions, as one might expect. 
Pitch and purity are metrically interdependent, and metrically indepen-
dent of loudness in the same sense as hue and chroma were interdependent, 
and independent of value. For a sound to be, the stimulus must 
(a) have Loudness *; and 
(b) have either both Pitch * and Purity *, 
or both Pitch - and Purity -. 
Thus, although any sound could be indicated as a point in a sound-solid pre-
viously described, the tendency to construe the sound-solid as consisting of 
4 metrically independent functions is incorrect. That tonality is dependent 
upon pitch I shall assume without further argument. But that pitch and 
purity are metrically interdependent, and metrically independent 
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of loudness, is obscured by referring to perceptual sound as a function of 
pitch, purity, and loudness. 
Metrically, perceptual sound would be more accurately determined as 
a function of loudness and noise (the latter being understoond as a measure 
of the increasing possibility of dissonance; i.e.,the emergence of pitch from 
noise). 
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Due to the historical accident that white-noise, until recently, has been a rel-
atively uncommon perceptual occurrence, workers in the field of sound have 
not tended to confuse 'white-noise' with the opposite of 'silence' (as their 
visual counterparts, 'white light' and the opposite of 'blackness', have been 
confused), but rather have understood that 'sound', whether noisy or pitch-
like, is the opposite of 'silence' and is a precondition for anyone perceiving 
anything on the pureness axis, whether noisy or pitch-like. 
By the same historical accident, men discovered how to build instru-
ments capable of producing relatively pure pitches long before they were able 
to build instruments capable of producing ranges of relatively unachromatic 
hues. Indeed, so easy has it been to construct instruments which can produce 
a variety of controlled and progressive noises (while in the playground of light 
exactly the reverse has been the case), that the notion of 'complementary 
noise' has played almost no part in the development of musical traditions, 
although a mathematically identical physical situation exists for both colors 
and sounds. That is, two noises whose energy levels would add to white-noise 
would be complementary in exactly the same sense as two colors whose ener-
gy levels add to white-light. Due to the historical paucity of controlled-noise 
instruments in contrast to the abundance of controlled-pitch instruments, 
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complementarity in sound has been considered only relative to its function 
over that part of the pureness axis furthest removed from white-noise; and, 
indeed, a special term has been traditionally employed to describe the sub-
tle complementary effects which occur in the range of greatest pureness of 
sound: dissonance. 
Dissonance, as a physical factor of the sound stimulus (not to be con-
fused with the varieties of pleasure which various cultures or individuals may 
find in stimuli of widely-varying dissonance), has been understood since the 
time of Helmholtz as being a factor determined by the relation existing be-
tween the overtone series of two notes. As was mentioned earlier, the spec-
trum of stimulus sound frequencies varies from lowest to highest by a fac-
tor of about 2' ° , such that there exist many frequencies which are integral 
multiples of others. When a note is sounded on a musical instrument like 
the piano, the strings not only vibrate at the fundamental frequency but 
simultaneously at many of the frequencies which are integral multiples of 
the fundamental (though not with equal amplitudes at each). These higher 
frequencies which are integral multiples of the fundamental are called 'over-
tones', and the family of overtones a 'harmonic series'. (In some instruments, 
like drums and rods, which vibrate when struck in a variety of frequencies 
which are not integral multiples of the fundamental, the family of frequen-
cies generated constitute a 'non-harmonic' series.) 
When two notes of varied fundamental frequencies are struck simul-
taneously, the resulting two families of overtones may have many frequen-
cies in common (as in the case of A and E), or few (as in the case of A and 
A#). The more frequencies the two families have in common, the less dis-
sonant the resulting sound (and the converse). Thus, A and E (in traditional 
terms, a 'perfect fifth') are much less dissonant than A and A# (a 'minor 
second'). It is also apparent, from this anlysis, why the dissonance of the 
notes of a minor second is greater when the notes are sounded sithultane-
ously than in succession, 
+11c2.'n caper, sounded 
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for in the latter instance the family of overtones of the Gb does not begin 
to sound until the overtone family of the F has begun to diminish in ampli-
tude, and hence the condition necessary for the most direct sound confronta-
tion between the two overtone families has been greatly curtailed. 
Helmholtz argued, and most have agreed, that the effect of dissonance 
arises when two overtone families have few frequencies in common because 
the possibility of two or more of their overtones producing beats is then 
greatest. (`Beats' are the effect which one notices when two strings of a 
single note on a piano are slightly out-of-tune: a constant fluctuation of 
amplitude caused by the fact that the energy waves of two nearly-identical 
frequencies sum to produce an energy wave with a frequency too low to be 
heard as a pitch, but having a noticeable even though very slow fluctuation in 
amplitude, i.e. a 'wow-wow-wow...etc.'. Piano tuners, and muscians with 
trained ears in general, are thus able to tune their instruments by listening 
for, and eliminating the conditions giving rise to, beats which occur when 
playing combinations of notes which ought not to beat audibly.) That this 
explanation has much to offer when speaking of sounds occuring at that 
part of the pureness axis furthest removed from white-noise, 1 shall not deny. 
But the fact that the production of beats is restricted to frequencies which 
differ from each other by not more than (approximately) 130 cycles per second 
(the human ear being unable to discriminate beats produced by frequencies 
further apart than this) seems to limit the effectiveness of the explanation as 
an account of dissonance in general, though it is surely adequate to describe 
the metric of such acute dissonances as those due to instruments producing 
families of overtones. 
The above conclusion is further strengthened when it is observed that 
the metric of acute dissonance can be explained, and with it the metric of 
dissonance in general, as the result of a single determination of the comple-
mentary function. It was noted above that the overtone families of A and E 
have more frequencies in common than the families of A and A#, and hence 
the latter sound more dissonant when sounded together. If the overtone 
family of A (fundamental frequency:110 cps) is plotted along the spectrum 
-of log-frequencies of the sound stimulus (assuming equal energies for all indi-
cated frequencies), 
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and the result of simultaneously sounding E (fundamental frequency: c. 165 
cps), or, alternatively, A# (fundamental frequency: c.116.54 cps) is shown 
by superimposing their overtone families respectively on that of A, 
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and if it is further recalled that white-noiseis defined to be that stimulus 
which results when nearly equal energy is present at all frequencies of the 
spectrum, 
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it becomes apparent that the situation determined by each A-A# is simply 
more like the situation occuring about each A or A# in the case of white-
noise than is the situation determined about either A or E by each A-E. 
Indeed, given any two successive A's, it is impossible to find a pitch which, 
when sounded between them, produces a situation less like that of white-
noise than the respective E, for it occurs, log-frequency wise, precisely half-
way between the two A's. 
A dissonant interval, thus, is simply a noisier interval (i.e. one whose 
overtone relationships are more cluttered about particular frequencies, and 
thus resemble more closely the situation about those frequencies which 
would be the result of white-noise). Remembering that the complementary 
function, as discussed above for colors, was a measure of the distance along 
the chromaticity axis away from the white-light (i.e. visual noise), it becomes 
apparent that dissonance can be explained simply as the effect of the comple-
mentary function, now applied to sounds, in those regions of the pureness 
axis furthest removed from white-noise: i.e. the effect of the complementary 
function at its subtlest. 
Tonality, thus, becomes that factor of sound determined by the comple-
mentary function at its subtlest. The sharp boundary between pitch and tone, 
always a terminological obscurant, vanishes, and in its place we find that 
sounds are more or less 'tonal' as they are more or less subtly determined by 
the complementary function. That is, the difference between the sound of 
two pitches, 
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when both are noisy (a), or when both are tonal (b), is not a difference in 
kind, but only in degree: the degree by which they differ respectively from 
the horizontal energy line defining white-noise, (c), 
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as determined by the complementary function. Dissonance, thus, is but 
extreme complementarity. 
5. Although 'noise' has been discussed above as designating the white-end 
of the complementarity axis, in the sense that the less complementary of two 
colors or sounds is the noisier, in Section III it will be found useful to have 
extended the meaning of the term such that, of two white noises, the one 
having the highest energy level may be said to be 'noisier' than the other. 
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For example, the white-noise A in the following diagram would be said to be 
`noisier' than the white-noise B. 
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(But I shall say more of this in Section III.) 
6. Perceptual color and sound, therefore, can each be determined metrically 
by identical logarithmic functions: 
(a) an energy-level function (called the 'value' scale for 
colors, and the 'loudness' scale for sounds); and 
(b) an energy-completion function (called the 'chromaticity' 
scale for colors, and the 'pureness' scale for sounds). 
By an energy-level function, I mean roughly that function which, given any 
perceptual color or sound as reference, allows us to determine, for any other 
two perceptual colors or sounds chosen at random, which of the two is more 
or less bright or loud than the other. Similarly., by an energy-completions 
function, I mean roughly that function which, given any perceptual color or 
sound" as reference, allows us to determine, for any other two perceptual 
colors or sounds chosen at random, which of the two is more or less comple-
mentary to the given than the other (i.e.,which of the two. when summed with 
the given, would come closer to completing a horizontal energy line, effecting 
either white-light or white-noise). 
7. What is time, and what is space? The answers can be pointed-to by saying: 
`That which is measured by a clock, and that which is measured by a rod of 
known length'. But what is a clock? The answer can be pointed-to by saying: 
`Any periodic function'. Any periodic function? Yes; and, as Einstein re-
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minded us, since to measure lengths we must repeatedly use a rod whose 
length is taken as given, rods are best considered periodic functions: i.e. 
spatial clocks. Thus, since 'space' and 'time' are nonsense apart from the 
notion of 'measurement', and spatiality, like temporality, requires clocks 
to be measured, the notion of 'clock' becomes fundamental. What is im-
portant, call it what you will, is that one thing which can be measured by 
clocks: let's say 'space-time'. But, then again, what is a clock? Apparently, 
as argued much earlier in this paper, the notion of function must be taken 
as given. A clock is a periodic (i.e. repeating) function. 
As was also argued earlier, to be ordered is to be determined by a func-
tion from a space taken as non-random. Hence, to be ordered in space-time 
is to be determined by a function from a periodic function (i.e.,to be corre-
lated with a clock). 
I am now going to assert something for whose truth I know not how 
to argue further: an object exists as a work of art if and only if it is deter-
mined by a function from a periodic function which it is itself. That is, a 
work of art must constitute a clock, a repeating function, in virtue of which 
every element in that work is ordered. Put another way, each element of a 
work of art must be determined by a function from that periodic function 
which all the elements are. Or, again, each element of a work of art must 
be correlated with that clock which they jointly constitute. 
The upshot of the above is that every object, to be a work of art, must 
possess its own metric, i.e., its own measurement function in virtue of which 
every element, and combination of elements, including the work of art itself, 
must be measurable; and since to be a measurement function, (i.e., a clock), one 
must be periodic, an object to be a work of art must be intrinsically periodic. 
• (It is in the above sense that works of art may be said to be 'timeless', 
for they can be measured, as works of art, only in terms of their own intrin-
sic metric which, being periodic, has no beginning or end. A Mozart sonata 
has neither a beginning nor an end any more than a sculpture by Rodin. We 
enter a gallery to see a work by Rodin, and having viewed it, depart along a 
corridor . To leave the work is not to have seen the end of the work, but to 
have isolated ourselves to a particular viewpoint along which the work even-
tually recedes into imperceptibility. The fact that we approach and leave a 
Mozart sonata by a different set of corridors, more abruptly, says much about 
us, but nothing about the sonata. The difference lies in our point-of-view 
and its abruptness, not in the metrics of the respective works themselves.) 
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That space-time is jointly a function of the point-of-view of a meas-
uring device was Einstein's insight. To Newton, the existence of a penny 
lying on a desk could be represented as a 4-dimensional figure (3 in space and 
1 in time), 
TI ME 
which could be theoretically measured from any number of viewpoints (eg. 
planes, above), all metrically correlatable. But Einstein saw that to change the 
viewpoint was, in many instances, to change the metric of that which was 
being measured. Indeed, some viewpoints possible in Newton's space and 
time were simply impossible, for to be in such a position would be to destroy 
any metrical characteristics of the object. Thus, space and time had to be 
replaced by a new notion, space-time, whose metric could be determined by 
the limits of measurement, i.e., by the clocks in one's possession. 
(That I should have spoken above of the metrics of a sculpture and of 
a sonata as being essentially the same may have seemed peculiar, for, like ar 
air conditioner whose omnipresent sound remains unnoticed, one tends to 
remain unaware of the acts of measurement upon which one's naive concep-
tions of time and space have been constructed. It is not until one looks to 
his acts of measuring themselves to discover what space and time are, that 
one finds them curiously unlike what one had assumed they must be. In-
deed, one finds them not at all, but rather a peculiar amalgam determined by 
the limits of one's acts of measuring.) 
8. What, then, is it like to encouter a work of art (in space-time)? That is, 
what sort of measuring act is it, what is the nature of its metric, what sort 
of clock is being used? For example, what does one measure wheri one hears 
49. 
a work of music? By looking at a section of a score, one might imagine that 
one was to measure a 4-dimensional object in Newton's sense, measurable 
from countlessly different perceptual perspectives (e.g.,lines, below) visa vis 
thesound and time axes. 
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But when one hears the piece of which the score is a notation, one can only 
hear (i.e.,measure) harmonic functions (a) and rhythmic functions (b), and 
hence the countrapuntal function (a) and (b) which determines them. The 
remaining perspectives are simply not indicative of any points-of-view which 
could be a perceptual possibility. (Notice, one could not sensibly assert, 
"Yes, in practice (a) and (b) are all we can hear, but the rest are perceptual 
possibilities", for what could be relevantly meant by a 'perceptual possibility' 
other than something which can in practice be a perspective of measuring? 
By denying that the rest could ever be perspectives of perceptual measure-
ment, one would have denied that they could be perceptual.) 
Thus, given that the visual score of a piece of music consists of marks 
on paper which can be perceived (i.e.imeasured, functioned) from a variety 
of visual perspectives (e.g.,from back to front, bottom to top, sideways, by 
circles, by triangles, etc.), it is simply a mistake to assume that the piece of 
music can be aurally perceived from perspectives corresponding to any or 
all of the visual ones of its score. The relation of score to musical work is 
essentially symbolic, and only incidentally perceptual. (And this holds in 
general for all notational devices. A blue-print needn't look-like an engine 
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to be a workable, and perhaps indispensable, aid in making one.) It is the 
temporal-and-spatial functions of the work of art which must determine 
whether or not a notated score is accurate, not the perceptual relations of 
the score which determine what the temporal-and-spatial functions of the 
work must be. Hence, it is to the perceptual measuring of temporal-and-
spatial functions in the works of art themselves that one must turn to under-
stand what sorts of clocks works of art are. 
9. Consider, then, the following two bars from the Sarabande of J. S. Bach's 
Sixth English Suite:7
The half-note, A, pointed-to by the single arrow, is correctly said to be equal 
in time to the four eight-notes, low D thru A, pointed-to by the double arrows, 
for the sound which is the A is heard continuously while the sound of low D 
thru A below are heard in succession (alternating with very brief silences be-
tween notes). Thus, given that the four lower sounds are of equal temporal 
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size (i.e. of equal duration), the half-note A can correctly be said to be four 
rimes the temporal size of any one of them. Notice what is happening from 
the perceptual perspective of a hearer: (1) two sounds (A and low D) are 
heard simultaneously; (2) the first continues to be heard, while the second 
ceases and a third begins (C) after a very short silence; (3) the first continues, 
while the third, ceasing when it has sounded as long as the second, gives way 
after a very short silence to a fourth (B); (4) the first continues, while the 
fourth, ceasing when it has sounded as long as the third (and second), gives 
way after a very short silence to a fifth (A' ); (5) the first and fifth cease to-
gether, after the fifth has sounded as long as the fourth (and third, etc.). 
Simply put, of course, something is changing while something else re-
mains unchanged. And that, metrically, is what time is all about. But notice, 
to have thus measured time is to have assumed measurements in sound space 
(i.e. to have assumed that one knows what 'change from C to B' metrically 
means). To have measured a change of sounds, however, is to have assumed 
already measurements in time (i.e. to have assumed that one knows what 
`change' means). It seems that to measure any object in space-time, i.e. to 
determine it metrically by a space-time function, is to presuppose a space-
time function as given. And yet I have maintained that the metric of a work 
of art is intrinsic in the sense that it can be measured only in terms of itself. 
Are the two positions at loggerheads, or do they say the same thing? 
Perhaps an analogy will help to clarify the above. Take the following 
diagram, 0 
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and construe the circles to represent the sounds A, and low D, C, B, and A' 
as follows: 
CU
The sounds, although represented by circles and letters on paper which 
necessarily have an order, are not themselves to be considered as having any 
order. What is required to order them? Consider a point-of-view, which 
functions like the corridor of parallel lines below. 
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ceasing, 
point-of-view after a brief silence with 
etc. The situation described is that whic 
That is, the two sounds Cis,) and are entertained; then, without (W) 
ceases, to be replaced at the same place in the context of the
; then, without ( A) ceasing, . . 
occurs when one hairs the passage 
scored above of Bach's Sixth English Suite. 
But notice: it is not correct to assume that, because the drawn circles 
were necessarily in visual order prior to constructing the point-of-view, and 
because the final diagram accurately represents a situation of perceiving 
sounds, that there exists a situation of non-perceived sounds corresponding 
to the drawn circles without the point-of-view lines. In fact, there does not. 
(To have assumed that there does would be either to have confused the 
necessary visual order of part of a diagram useful in describing a situation, or 
to have construed part of the diagram as representing a sound-space which is 
determined by some function, without specifying what the function is; i.e. 
to have surrepticiously assumed the presence of something akin to the point-
of-view lines without drawing them into the diagram.) The drawn circles by 
themselves are meaningless (i.e. they represent no situation). In this sense, 
they are incomplete symbols awaiting further diagrammatic assistence before 
they can properly be taken to represent anything (much as the letters of the 
alphabet are meaningless until taken in a certain context, i.e.,from a certain 
point-of-view, as words in sentences). 
Sounds, therefore, (and colors) cannot be considered apart from a point-
of-view which determines them as functions of space-time, for to be considered 
at all is to be represented as ordered by a function, and to be represented as 
ordered by some function other than space-time is not to be represented as 
54. 
sounds (or colors). Hence, although I may in one circumstance refer to a 
notation of a work of art as representing sound-functions, and in another 
as representing space-time functions, the notions are equivalent: to represent 
sound functions is to represent space-time functions. (The original energy-
level and energy-completion diagrams of sounds and colors, thus, must be 
understood in the same sense as representing functions of space-time.) 
10. What sort of clocks, then, are works of art? As determined by sound-
functions, or color-functions, they are sound or color clocks, in that their 
space-time metrics are so determined. The difference between works of art 
and other objects is that in the former the metrics are intrinsic, while in the 
latter extrinsically determined, in that the metric which is determined by 
the sound or color clocks of the former exists only within the work of art 
as a whole, and is relevant to measuring only those sound or color functions 
by which the work (the clock) is itself determined. 
In this regard, the notion of a 'periodic function' deserves closer atten-
tion. To change periodically (i.e.,to be a clock) is not only to change relative 
to something which remains unchanged, but necessarily to become over and 
over again something indistinguishable from what one was before except for 
being later. (Again, circular definitions are the order of my day.) For example, 
if I take the natural numbers as my space, 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . 
and determine that series which is ordered from the space by applying the 
function 
n — 3k (where k is any number of the space such 
that 3k < n < 3 (k + 1)) 
to each number (n) of the space in turn, I obtain the ordered series 
1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, . . . 
The numbers in this series are periodically determined in the sense that each 
term. is indistinguishable from those terms which are 3-terms removed from 
it functionally, except for the fact of being 3-terms removed. (Every third 
term is said to be 'numerically identical'.) And the series itself, therefore, is a 
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periodic function, for each group of three numbers in turn is indistinguish-
able from the 3-numbered groups immediately preceding and following it. 
Suppose I call each 3-numbered group beginning with '1' a 'triad', and, 
beginning with first, distinguish them from one another in order by associa-
ting with each in turn a natural number in order: 
1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, . . . 
1 2 3 4 .5 . 
The ordinary rules of arithmetic can be defined for the new composite 
series, and if I call the triad associated with the natural number '1' the 
`first triad', that with the number '2' the `second triad', etc., it can easily be 
seen that the new series constitutes a clock, for with it I can measure any 
series of numbers, random or otherwise. For example, if I place the new 
series in funccional relationship to (e.g.,next to) the series of even 
numbers thusly, 
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 1.4, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, . . . 
1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, . . . 
1 2 3 4 • • • 
I can say correctly that the even number 8 occurs two triads earlier than the 
even number 20 (or `to the left of, or anywhere else consistently intelligible). 
A similar principle holds for all repeating functions, whether numerical 
or otherwise. Any repeating function determined from a given space, and 
capable of being functionally related to another space, constitutes a clock in 
virtue of which the latter can be measured. Thus, any periodic progression 
of colors or sounds, in particular those within works of art, constitute clocks 
in virtue of which the whole can be measured. It was pointed-out earlier that 
polyadic functions can only be sensed, not defined, at present, and hence 
periodic polyadic functions assuredly cannot be defined as were the numerical 
`triads' discussed above, only sensed. Yet the notion of periodic progressions 
of colors and sounds (e.g.,shapes, lines, contours, themes, rhythms) as stan-
dards of evaluation and appreciation are present in every discussion of works 
of art. The point is that they are essential to an object being a work of art, 
in that they provide the only means by which the work can be measured, 
and they are intrinsic to it. 
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A clock, then, is not an object which measures either time or space in-
dependently of the other. Rather, it is itself a function of space-time (i.e. in 
the older Newtonian terms, it exists only within a particular point-of-view), 
and measures other functions of space-time. Color-functions and sound-
functions, then, as clocks, are functions of space-time which measure in turn 
other functions of space-time: color-functions and sound-functions. (Indeed, 
within a work of art which consists of both color-functions and sound-func-
tions (e.g.,the film `8'/1'), it is incorrect to speak of them as distinct except 
as determined by a color-sound-function in general. In this thesis, however, 
I shall remain principally concerned with the cinema as a purely visual medium.) 
A working notation which would be sufficient to indicate color-functions, or 
sound-functions, therefore, would at the same time be sufficient to indicate 
the functions of space-time relevant to the work of art in progress, for the 
functions are equivalent. 
(It is in this sense that many of the object-words which I use to speak of 
periodic color-functions in a film, eg. 'Cary Grant', refer to a certain percep-
tual pattern of colors which (recognizably) is repeated at intervals in the film, 
and against whose metric other elements in the film, and the film itself, are to 
be judged. The figure of Cary Grant in a film, as a periodic color-function, is 
a clock, and therefore a function of space-time. At any given moment, of 
course, it exists in this capacity vis a vis the other color-fiinctions present. 
But it also exists as a function of a progressing series of color-functions (and, 
as was pointed-out earlier, an entire tradition of 'dramatic' terminology has 
been developed to enable filmmakers concerned only with color-functions 
such as 'Cary Grant' to notate their working notions in an abbreviated and 
hence more easily, though less exhaustively, workable fashion ).) 
11. Thusfar in this Section, color-functions and sound-functions have been 
shown to be determinable by the same two mathematical functions, and to 
be functions of perceptual space-time. And, indeed, as functions of space-
time, certain sound-functions and color-functions can be formally equated. 
For instance, as discussed above, the sound-function diagrammed as follows 
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requires that a particular sound, A, be perceptually present while each of four 
other sounds, low D thru A, (each of which are determined by an energy-level 
and an energy-completion function to A and to each other) be made percep-
tually present in succession. In precisely the same sense, a particular color, (3, 
could be made to be perceptually present while each of four other colors, L, 
a, ir, and 0 (each of which were determined by energy functions to (3, and to 
each other) could be made perceptually present in succession. (Imagine a 
film in which a particular color is held constant in some area of the lower 
left side of the screen, while a succession of four related colors appears in 
some area of the upper right side of the screen.) 
But the above example shows that a singular difference between color-
functions and sound-functions, as functions of space-time, also exists. For 
what corresponds, in the space-time of perceptual sound, to the directions 
`lower left' or 'upper right' in the space-time of perceptual color? Apparently 
there is a difference in the metric of the two space-time functions. 
And yet one must be careful to decide whether or not this prima facie 
metrical difference is actual, for, as I have shown in discussing 'tonality' and 
`dissonance' versus 'complementarity' above, at least one other prima facie 
metrical difference between the two functions is actually a difference of 
degree, not kind, and hence not metrical. In this instance, as with the other, 
the evidence seems to indicate that the difference is not metrical either. 
Composers of music have traditionally been concerned to write for 
instruments which, in performance, were to remain at a given space-time 
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position visa vis the members of the audience. It simply would have made 
no practical sense, in Mozart's time, to write (e.g.) a concerto for oboe and 
chamber orchestra in which the sound of the oboe was to move spatially 
relative to that of the orchestra, for neither oboist nor orchestra could have 
been expected to have much freedom of spatial movement relative to each 
other and the audience. (There were limited exceptions. Compositions were 
written to be sung 'antiphonally' by two choirs situated in opposite lofts of 
the church, for example; and (e.g.,) the Gabrieli's (c_. 1510-1610 A.D.) com-
posed works requiring similar spatial distinctness between brass and other 
instrumental choirs. But the exceptions only prove the rule.) 
This is not to say, of course, that spatial sense was neglected. The 
seating of orchestras (strings grouped together on one side, etc.) was stan-
dardized after experimentation on precisely this point. But the possibilities 
of this sense were curtailed by the practical spatial restrictions on the means of 
producing sounds available. To have asked for the sound of an organ flying 
above the trumpets and ending beneath the floor would have been to speak 
nonsensically. 
The advent of recording devices and multiple-speaker systems, how-
ever, has changed this picture almost overnight, though few composers for 
orchestral instruments have recognized the fact pragmatically. Multiple-
speaker systems have come to be known as 'stereo' systems, for their ability 
to reproduce the perceptual space-time sounds of the concert hall. But, as a 
few composers are imagining, to limit the spatial possibilities of such systems 
to reproducing the sound relationships deriving from an orchestra of spatially 
fixed instruments is to stick one's head in the compositional sand. Given a 
room with a speaker in each of the eight corners; the perceptual sound of an 
organ playing C# emerging from each of two speakers at diametrically oppo-
site corners of the room is a different function (i.e.,a different sound) from 
the sound of an organ playing C# emerging from either speaker in isolation, 
or from any other two speakers. 
Hence, although the ear has been taken to be much less effective physio-
logically as a spatial discriminator than the eye (due to its lack of focusing 
ability), the difference is one of degree, not kind; and one need only recog-
nize wherein lies the difference between hearing a monaural reproduction and 
a stereo reproduction to become clear on the matter for my purposes. It is 
apparent, I should think, that sound composers in the future will make intel-
ligible notions like 'lower left' and 'upper right' with regard to their own 
works, though perhaps not as precisely as visual composers. 
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The point of the above discussion is that there is no metrical difference 
between the perceptual space-time functions of sound and color. (It should 
also be clear, however, why it is currently impossible to make a visual trans-
cription of a musical composition in the traditional sense, for such composi-
tions were largely unconcerned with that metrical aspect of their perceptual 
space-time functions which is of immediate concern to any visual composition. 
Due to historical accident, the musical composers of the past have had no 
need to concern themselves with the 'lower left'-ness or 'upper right'-ness of 
their sound-functions; but it is with precisely this aspect of his color-func-
tions that a composer of colors must be immediately concerned.) 
12. What, then, is the metric of perceptual space-time? There are several ways 
in which (as I have shown) it ought not to be conceived: 
(a) It does not consist of four independent dimensions, three 
spatial and one temporal. For: 
(1) no measurement of perceptual space-time can be taken 
without using clocks which presuppose measurements in 
both space and time (Newtonian sense); and 
(2) time cannot be considered an independent dimension, for, 
unlike mathematically proper functions, it is irreversible 
in some curious sense (which I shall not discuss, though 
the sense of which I shall assume); 
(b) It cannot be conceived apart from the existence of clocks which 
measure it; 
(c) It cannot be mathematically expressed, for it involves at the 
very least polyadic functions which, as I have shown in Section I, 
can only be sensed at present. (I have a hunch it depends upon 
complex polyadic functions akin to those which determine the 
growth-patterns found in nature, about which I know very 
little.) 
Given (b), however, the working composer in color or sound can know that 
the metric of perceptual space-time depends essentially upon the existence 
of clocks, and hence that by clarifying his sensitivity to the presence of 
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clocks he is clarifying his sense of the functions of perceptual space-time 
determining his work. For the last time, then,. what is a clock? 
It was shown above that any periodic (i.e.,repeating) function can 
serve as a clock. But is there some perceptual feature, some earmark (or 
eyemark) by which a working composer can decide which color or sound 
functions are indeed periodic? The answer, although expressed earlier 
by saying that all elements of a work of art must measure and be measured 
by it, may yet seem surprising: any continuous function may be considered 
periodic. To ask the question is precisely analogous to asking 'When is a 
line straight?', and the answer can be seen as follows: 
cap 
(b) 
Of lines (a) and (b), which is straight? If one should answer 'b', and should 
then be asked 'But how can you tell?', one might answer that, if (b) were 
to be divided into equal segments and perpendiculars erected from the end 
of those segments to line (a), it would be seen that the segments of line (a) 
were not equal; hence (a) must be curved and (b) straight. 
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But, by reversing the same procedure, if one had begun with line (a), divided 
it into equal segments, and erected perpendiculars from it to (b), it would 
have been seen that the segments of (b) were not equal, hence (b) must be 
curved and (a) straight. 
The point is that it makes sense to speak of one line being straight, or 
curved, only as it is determined by a function from another line given as 
being straight or curved. And since, for our purposes, a line may be con-
sidered straight if and only if it consists of contiguous segments of equal 
length, such a line is a periodic function. Hence, any continuous function 
may be taken as periodic (i.e.,as a clock). 
The words 'contiguous' and 'continuous' were used above for the first 
time, though the notions of contiguity and continuity have been assumed 
thruout this paper. I shall not attempt to clarify their meaning here beyond 
simply saying that two things are contiguous if and only if nothing exists 
between them. If two things are contiguous, then the function determining 
them is said to be continuous with respect to them. To the working composer, 
however, the notions must be intuitively grasped with assurance, for they 
alone determine which of the color-functions (or sound-functions) available 
to him can be taken as periodic functions of perceptual space-time. That 
is, it seems a necessary condition of the metric of perceptual space-time, 
be it what it may, that its functions be continuous. Hence, although the 
composer is free to take any continuous color-function (or sound-function) 
as a clock against which to measure other functions, (a) the function he 
chooses must be a continuous function, and (b) it must be taken to be 
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periodic (i.e. to be a function which permits him to measure other con-
tinuous functions; that is, it must permit him to operate in a fashion analo-
gous to 'erecting perpendiculars' in the above example of the lines). 
The working composer, of course, begins with single functions (e.g. 
`themes' in music) and develops his work from these. It is, therefore, 
imperative that he learn to develop his sense of periodicity in these ele-
mental themes, whether visual or aural, so that he may learn to develop 
other themes from them which, when related contiguously to the others, 
are determined by richer functions without loss of the elemental periodicity 
(i.e. rhythm). 
12. To an extent, therefore, I think I may now summarize the answer to the 
question with which this Section began, 'What are the limits on the func-
tional possibilities of cinematic space?', as follows: 
All functions of cinematic space: 
(1) must be functions of color-functions and sound-functions, 
which, in turn, can be expressed in terms of two functions: 
(a) an energy-level function; and 
(b) an energy-completion function; 
(2) must be functions of perceptual space-time; hence continuous, 
and thus measurable by clocks (i.e. other continuous periodic 
functions). 
(All other functions of cinematic space (e.g.,dramatic, documentary, 
etc.) must be expressible as convenient working abbreviations of 
color and sound functions.) 
What is needed, therefore, to provide the working composer with a notational 
means of expressing and developing his elemental ideas according to his finest 
functional sense, is a procedure which would enable him to combine the maxi-
mum degree of clarity in identifying these energy functions with which he 
begins, with the greatest flexibility in comparing and contrasting (i.e.,measur-
ing) such functions with each other once they were identified. (In the latter 
sense, it ought also to include a means of easily and accurately abbreviating 
functions of such functions, so that composers would be free to work system-
atically on less-finely controlled levels of expression.) 
I now turn to the task of describing such a procedure. 
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Section III: On a procedure for composition 
1. In this Section of the paper I shall be concerned with describing a work-
able set of procedures to be used in the composing of a film. I shall not be 
concerned with describing a means whereby a film, so composed, may then 
be expressed in a notation easily reproducible on the printed page. (This is 
not to say that the former may not lend itself easily to such a transcription, 
but only that my concern is with the former as such.) 
As indicated in Section II, color and sound functions can each be ex-
pressed using identical energy functions. Having used the word 'noisier' to 
designate that element in an energy function which is closest to the white 
end of the complementarity (i.e.,dissonance) scale for either color or sound, 
I shall now extend the meaning of the word to designate that white noise 
which has a higher energy level than another. Thus, not only is color (or 
sound) A noisier than B, 
Log 
Ener9 
COMPLEMENTARITY • 
but white noise (sound or color ) C is noisier, i.e. more intense, than D. 
Log C I 
Energy 
1.03 FreVenC3 
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(That the above two graphs are not incompatible will be evident when it is 
remembered that the cornplementarity axis of the former is but an abbrevia-
tion for a complex of functions expressible on the latter graph. The latter 
graph, then, is logically prior.) 
2. Consider now a certain space which I shall call the perceptual field, 
corresponding (roughly) to the area-in-time which is contained within the 
frame of a projected film. For purposes of analysis, 1 shall represent the 
field as it exists at any given moment by 
- -----
40e
assuming that there is no energy present either beyond the boundaries of the 
frame or within the frame, unless otherwise specified. The frame-line, thus, 
is only an abstraction which must be filled-in with energy-specifications to 
become indicative of any perceptual situation whatever. 
I shall assume for the remainder of this paper that there is no energy 
forthcoming from beyond the boundaries of the frame. As any filmmaker 
knows, this description does not even approximate normal projection situa-
tions; but the exercise of assuming that it does will simplify my discussion, 
and the means of extending the discussion to situations where energy is 
present beyond the boundaries should become apparent to anyone interested 
in pursuing it further. 
Given the above assumption, the noisiest possible situation available to 
the film-composer is the situation when the projector lamp is simply turned-
on and the screen is evenly illuminated. No greater level of energy can fall 
onto atiy area of the screen (for the bulb is assumed to be operating at con-
stant and peak efficiency), nor can a greater level of energy fall onto the whole 
of the screen. 
The noisiest possible state of the perceptual field, thus, is when all of it 
is as white as possible. (That is, whenever the intensity of the light at any 
point in the field is as high as it can be . and the sum of the intensities of the 
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light at all points in the field is as high as it can be.) Diagrammatically, the 
situation can be described as follows: 
(Although I shall not, in general, shade the area surrounding the field, it 
ought always to be taken as shaded, i.e.,as providing no energy stimulation 
whatever, unless otherwise specified.) 
Consider now, two areas of equal size x2 of maximum-intensity white 
noise situated within the visual field at a distance x from each other. 
•MMM Mom •1•111M. MOM. 
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Consider next that rectangle of the visual space bounded by the two areas. 
1.• 
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Its area is 3x2 . The area of the rectangle in which no energy is present is x2 . 
If I take x to be the fundamental unit of measurement of length in the visual 
field, and let the maximum intensity of energy available per any unit area x2
be 1, it is apparent that the above situation differs from the noisiest possible 
situation of the rectangle (i.e.,the situation in which maximum energy is 
present at all points in the rectangle) in that only 2/3's of the total possible 
energy is present. 
But notice, it differs in yet another way, which can be seen as follows: 
suppose that the two areas were to move so that they become adjacent rather 
than being separated by a distance x. 
The resulting situation still presents only 2/3's of the total possible energy 
vis-a-vis the original rectangle. But, whereas in the former situation it would 
have been impossible to find a contiguous area greater than x2 in size in which 
the intensity of energy per unit area was identical to that of the rectangle in 
its noisiest possible state, now there exists a contiguous area 2x2 in size which 
has this property (and an unlimited number of contiguous areas less than 2x2
but greater than x2 in size which have this property). That is, a greater con-
tiguous area of the rectangle in the second situation matches in average inten-
sity the noisiest possible situation of the rectangle. 
Thus, although the total energy present in the visual field is identical in 
each instance, the latter situation is noisier than the former, for a greater con-
tiguous area of the visual field of the latter is identical in quality (i.e. average 
intensity of energy present) to that of the noisiest possible state of the entire 
visual field. 
From the above, it should be apparent that, if two objects of maximum 
intensity white noise were such that the first was greater in area than the 
second, the first would be noisier than the second. For suppose the area of 
the first to be 2x2 , that of the second to be x2 , and the maximum intensity 
of energy per unit area x2 to be I: the first object would contain twice the 
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contiguous area identical in quality to that of the noisiest possible state of the 
visual field. 
To re-emphasize again, then, noise is not just a measure of the average 
intensity of energy per unit area of the visual field, but also a measure of the 
concentration of that average intensity of energy. For example, of the fol-
lowing three functions of the visual field, 
I 
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A is less noisy than B, which is less noisy than C, although the average 
intensity of energy per unit area of the visual field is the same in each in-
stance. The point is that these unit areas of C having the highest average 
intensities of energy are concentrated together, giving C the largest con-
tiguous area identical in quality to that of the noisiest possible state of the 
visual field. 
If the visual field contains just two objects of uniform maximum in-
tensity per unit area, therefore, it is in general the case that the larger object 
is noisier than the smaller, and that the closer the two objects come to each 
other, the noisier the visual situation becomes. And, although the mathe-
matics is not available to functionally determine accurately cases of more 
than 3 objects in general, (except under limiting circumstances), a similar 
conclusion holds for 3 or more objects: (a) the larger the object, the noisier 
it is; (b) the closer together objects come, the noisier the situation becomes; 
and (c), if all objects are of equal size, the more objects there are, the noisier 
the situation is. 
3. The above discussion has been concerned with the effect of the visual 
field at any moment of time. But, of course, the visual field does not exist 
instantaneously. Rather, it consists of a bounded portion of perceptual space-
time. If the restrictions noted in Section II on considering time as distinct 
from space are kept in mind, it will do no harm to consider time as a unique 
axis for my present purposes. The noisiest possible state of the visual field 
for any interval of time To — Ta, then , would be that situation in which the 
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maximum amount of energy is present at all points in the visual field at all 
moments from Ta to To , as represented by the solid ABCDEFGH in the 
following figure: 
7 4.
Tpt
If I consider the interval To — Ta as being divided into 5 segments of equal 
duration, and represent the visual field (the area perpendicular to the Time 
axis) as it exists as a limit at each of the six moments in order, the above 
representation can be abbreviated in a fashion more suitable to my purposes 
as follows: 
Ta T Tz T3 T+ TP 
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(Again, I shall not bother to shade around the frames shown below, though 
they ought to be considered as so shaded.) 
An analysis similar to that given above for perceptual objects at any 
moment of time can now be given for perceptual objects existing thru inter-
vals of time. The above set of six time-shots of the visual field represents the 
noisiest possible situation of the field, for it expresses the situation in which 
the maximum amount of energy is present at all points in the visual field 
(i.e.,at all times). 
Consider two objects of equal volume (and: of uniform maximum inten-
sity of energy) separated by a time interval as follows: 
(37 (0
-r,„ Ti T3 T4 
On
A To + 1
(The objects are to be taken as existing continuously thru the intervals T2 - Ta
and 1))3 4 1 - T4 ). Consider now the same two objects presented so that they 
become temporally contiguous, as follows: 
00 
To( T3 T4 T T(3+1 
(The objects are now to be taken as one object existing continuously thru the 
interval Ti3±1 - T2 ). By an argument precisely analogous to that given above 
for the instantaneous visual field, it is evident that the latter situation is noisier 
than the former, for a greater contiguous area (i.e.,volume) of space-time mat-
ches the noisiest possible state of the entire visual field in average intensity of 
energy per unit area. 
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By a precisely analogous argument, also, it could be shown that, of two 
areas of space-time presenting uniform maximum intensity of energy, the 
larger is the noisier. And the arguments can be extended to three or more 
objects. In general, then, for objects of uniform maximum intensity of en-
ergy in perceptual space-time, (a) the larger the object, the noisier it is; and 
(b), the closer together objects come, the noisier the situation becomes; and 
(c), if all objects are of equal size, the more objects there are, the noisier the 
situation is. 
4. Perhaps one aspect of the above deserves closer attention. Consider the 
following representations of objects of uniform maximum intensity of energy 
per unit area in perceptual space-time. 
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Which of the two represents the noisiest situation? At any instant of time, 
both have the same concentration of average intensities per unit area; hence, 
one might expect that the summation of such concentration would be identical. 
But such is not the case, and, indeed, from the information given above, one 
cannot determine which is noisier. For, consider the following three top-
views of the continuum of perceptual space-time each of which is compatible 
with the situations as described above: 
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In the first case, object I is noisier than object II, for indeed there is no 
object II; rather, five distinct objects were represented and erroneously 
taken to be a contiguous object II. In the second case, object II' is noisier 
than object I', for the contiguous area of space-time of object II' is greater 
than that of object I'. In the third case, object II" is much noisier than 
object I" (and also noisier than object II' of the second case), for the con-
tiguous area of its space-time is much greater than that of object I". 
Three things should be obvious from the above. Firstly, an instanteous 
area of the visual field which remains unmoved thru time, all things being 
equal, is less noisy than an equal area which moves continuously thru time. 
Secondly, the faster an area moves, the noisier it becomes in comparison 
with other areas. And thirdly, the story-board method of representing 
functions of perceptual space-time, without modification, is necessarily 
ambiguous to the detriment of compositional precision. 
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5. The above analysis of perceptual noise in general does not hold only for 
areas of uniform maximum intensity of energy. As was shown in Section II, 
the relative complementarity of colors (and sounds) is but a subtle noise 
function. Hence, one ought to expect that the above analysis could be exten-
ded to encompass uniform areas of non-maximum intensity without further 
ado. And, indeed, it can be. For example, given two areas of equal size and 
identical color at a given distance from each other, if the first should change 
to a more pastel (whiter, less complementary) color, the resulting visual 
situation would become more noisy. Similarly, if the resulting two areas 
should now come closer together, the resulting visual situation would be-
come even more noisy. (Similar arguments hold precisely for sound func-
tions.) And the above sorts of situations could be extended to include three 
or more color-areas (or sound areas) by arguments analogous to those given 
above for multiple areas of uniform maximum intensities of energy. 
6. Thruout the above discussion, I have assumed constancy of shape on the 
part of the color areas under discussion, overlooking until now the fact that 
continuous areas, like continuous functions, can be conceived in a limiting 
sense as consisting of infinitesimals (areas) integrated in a certain manner, 
and that consequently a change in the shape of an area would necessarily 
change the visual relationship between many of these infinitesimal areas and 
thus (by my earlier argument) necessarily effect incremental changes in the 
noise-level of the visual field. 
I must now indicate in a workable manner how changes in the shape 
of a single area of maximum intensity energy can be expected to modify the 
noise-level of the visual field. (As in the previous discussions, I shall use 
mathematical notation only when necessary, hoping to avoid superficialities 
while remaining intelligible to the working composer.) 
It was noted earlier that a noise-function is really a completion function, 
indicating how much .a particular perceptual situation would have to be modi-
fied for it to become the densest energy situation possible. A noise-function, 
thus, could be conceived as an energy density function (e.g.,the closer together 
two unit areas come, the noisier the situation, etc.). 
But a question immediately arises: If two unit areas effect a noisier per-
ceptual situation when two units apart than when four units apart, how much 
noisier is it? That is, if Fig. 1 
H X 14_ 
2 x i 
73. 
indicates a noisier perceptual situation than. Fig. 2, 
(for the contiguous area of maximum intensity energy is greater in Fig. 1 
than Fig. 2, even though the percentage of the visual field at maximum 
energy is the same in either case), how are we to measure the difference in 
noisiness? Even if we accept Fig. 1 as momentarily representing our unit 
standard of measurement (as noise-level = 1.00), how are we to determine 
how much less continguous are the unit areas in Fig. 2? What are we to 
take as the standard of contiguity? 
For purposes of analysis, if we consider the visual field (e.g., a motion 
picture screen) as it exists instantaneously, it is apparent that a single unit 
area of maximum intensity white light would be surrounded by many unit 
areas of darkness. 
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How noisy the perceptual situation would be would depend upon how large 
the unit area is, relative to the rest of the visual field. The larger the visual 
field (i.e.,the more unit areas of darkness), the less noisy the perceptual situa-
tion given the single unit area of maximum intensity white light. 
Suppose now I introduce another unit area of maximum intensity white 
light, two linear units away. 
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Considering the circular area about the first unit area having a radius of 7x , 
it is apparent by simple computation that there exists at least an area of  2
491r x2 — 2x2 of darkness (the area of the circle minus the two unit areas), 
i.e. at least 49/r — 8  or 38.47 unit areas of darkness, having equal or greater 
claim to our perceptual attention vis a vis the first unit area than the second 
unit area, for they also exist at distances equal or less than 2x from the 
first unit area. 
Suppose the second unit area were now to be moved twice as far away. 
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Considering the circular area about the first unit area having a radius of llx 
it is apparent by a similar computation to the above that there are at 2 
least 121 Tr - 8  or 92.99 unit areas of darkness having equal or greater claim 
4 
to our perceptual attention visa vis the first unit area than the second unit 
area, for they also exist at distances equal or less than 4x from the first unit 
area. 
The above is meant simply to indicate in detail that the result of 
doubling the distance between two unit areas of maximum intensity energy 
is much more than to double the number of unit areas of darkness which 
must now be considered as being in the perceptual vicinity of the first unit 
area. That is, the continguity relationship is not linear. 
As gravitational analogies have often been of frequent assistance in the 
thesis, it ought now to be recalled that Newton demonstrated that all gravi-
tational problems involving two spherical masses could be treated mathe-
matically as if each mass were concentrated at a point. In such a situation, 
the effect of the gravitational field about either point falls off as the square 
of the distance. That is, at a pointy located twice as far as point x from 
mass M, the effect of the gravitational field of mass M (G) is one-fourth as 
great. 
G=P G=P 
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In general, the effect of the gravitational field about a mass decreases as the 
square of the distance from the mass. The gravitational effect of a mass, there-
fore, is an inverse square function of the increasing linear distance of a point 
in the field from the mass. 
But would we be justified in assuming that the mathematical treatment 
of noise-functions is also an inverse square, or is the gravitational analogy 
simply happenstance? Earlier I indicated how doubling the distance between 
two areas of maximum intensity white noise more than doubles the amount 
of darkness involved in the perceptual relationship, hence more than halving 
the noise-level of the perceptual situation in general. The resulting noise-
level was not 1/4 of the original, but it must be remembered that I was not 
speaking of point-sources of light, either. Had I chosen to speak of a point-
source of light, the resulting drop in the noise level would have been 1/4, for 
areas of circles increase as the square of their radii. That is, to move twice 
as far from a point-source of light is to lessen by 1/4 its effect as a noise-
argument, for the area of darkness has been increased four times, not merely 
doubled. 
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Newton, of course, was integrating in a 3-dimensional space, while I have 
been concerned with the instantaneous 2-dimensional surface of a projec-
tion screen. Newton was concerned with the falling-off of a force as it de-
creased with distance, while I, by nature of the definition of a noise func-
tion, havebeen concerned with the increase in the areas of darkness as dis-
tance increases. But mathematically the results are identical: in each in-
stance, the effect decreases as the square of the distance. For, as the usual 
Newtonian gravitational diagrams illustrate, Newton was in effect concerned 
with increasing areas at a distance from a point-source (although, unlike my 
screen, these areas do not occur in the same plane, but rather in parallel 
planes). 
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Put in simple terms, areas of maximum intensity white noise don't attract 
each other in any sense. But the noise-function is such that one is concerned 
with relative areas of light and darkness, and the relative squared increase 
in areas of darkness vis a vis a given point of light as one increases one's dis-
tance from it. Superficially, this appears different from Newton's concerns. 
But although Newton was dealing with attractive forces, he was interested 
in the relative squared increase in the area of the surfaces perpendicular 
to a point over which a given force from the point had to spread its effect, 
for as the areas of the perpendicular surfaces increase as the square of the 
distance from the point, the effect of the gravitational force decreases in-
versely as -the square of the distance. Thus, mathematically, the situations 
of a gravitational force in 3-dimensional physical space and a noise-function 
in 2-dimensional visual space arc identical. 
(The transition from the instantaneous 2-dimensional visual space to 
areas of light and darkness changing in time, therefore, is made in a mathe-
matically similar fashion to making the transition from the instantaneous 
3-dimensional gravitational space to the effect of masses changing position 
in time.) 
7. Before proceeding to apply the results of the above analysis to some 
typical noise-function, I wish to comment upon a further parenthetical 
question: Do we remember perceptual noise-functions logarithmically? 
That is, do our memories of perceptual noise-functions fade logarithmically? 
What I am going to say in this section is strictly conjectural, for the 
psychological experiments which have been conducted on time-perception 
are either irrelevant to this point or inconclusive. But the conjecture is in-
tended to be carefully made, and to be based upon observation of my own 
ways of remembering. I submit that the perceptual effect of a given noise-
, function.(as opposed to our idea of the perceptual effect) ceases to exist 
logarithmically. As I am convinced (for independent reasons which I shall 
not discuss here) that art is structurally dependent upon perceptual effects, 
and not upon the ideas arising from them, I am therefore inclined to think 
that the formal structure of the peculiarly temporal arts like music and the 
cinema, with their emphasis on thermatic development, must be dependent 
upon this logarithmic memory fade. 
But how can I argue for this conjecture? I know of no way, except 
to say that it strikes me as most certainly not obviously incorrect, and from 
my own experience quite likely to be correct. To take a simple example, 
the conjecture is that the bell I heard ten seconds ago will have, not one-
half, but more nearly one-fourth the perceptual effect it now has ten 
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seconds hence. Perhaps, like most perceptual matters, questions of the 
degree of concentration of the perceiver are so entwined with strictly 
physiological reactions that no precise figure can be given for perception 
and perceivers in general. Since composers are hardly perceivers in gen-
eral, however, possessing uniquely-developed powers of concentration, the 
field is narrowed somewhat. And I think most composers would agree 
that one senses the fact that an event perceived 20 seconds ago is not one-
half as fresh as it was 10 seconds ago, but much less than that. (The im-
mediacy of the moment falls-off so quickly.) Given the pervasive influ-
ence of logarithmic scales in perceptual studies, I suggest that it is not 
unlikely that the effect-fade of which I speak is also logarithmic in nature. 
(And notice: experiments claiming to have shown that time is not perceived 
logarithmically because we can judge linear intervals accurately are irrele-
vant to this suggestion. I'm not here speaking of the correctness of our 
ideas about our perceptions, but about our fading perceptions themselves.) 
Needless to say, if the conjecture is correct it has great relevancy for 
the formal structures of the temporal arts in particular. But such an analy-
sis lies beyond the scope of this paper, in the remainder of which I shall be 
concerned solely with noise-functions of the instantaneous 2-dimensional 
visual space. 
8. Now that the relevance of the gravitational analogue has been made 
clear, let me clarify one other lesson we can learn from it. The gravitational 
attraction between two masses, M1 and M2 is given by the formula 
F =G mt M2 
where d is the distance between the masses, and G is a constant (which for 
my purposes can be neglected, since it can always be made equal to one by 
choosing suitable units of measurement). 
If one were to concern himself only with equal areas (i.e.,analogous to 
equal masses), the relative noise-difference (i.e.,difference in attraction, 
translated into area terms) between the situation in which two areas (a) are 
at a distance cl, apart, and the situation in which they are at distance d2
apart, would be indicated by the difference between the values of the two 
ratios 
2-
a. 
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Since I am not interested in establishing absolute units of noise-value, 
but only in determining the relative noise-value of one visual situation 
versus another (with which it may be formally structured in a work of art), 
the relative noise ratio of the above two situations (taking the first as 
standard) is given by the ratio of the noise value of the first situation to 
that of the second. 
d 1-
d 
Clearly, the numerators are irrelevant, cancelling each other out. Hence, the 
relative noise ratio between situation one (with masses at distance cl, apart) 
and situation two with masses at distance d2 apart reduces to the ratio 
a 22. 
d," 
or 
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In simple terms, given two equal areas, the noise-value of the visual situation 
is an inverse function of the square of their distances apart. 
9. It may seem as if I have simply formalized more precisely what I have al-
ready said in the thesis concerning two areas, yet remain as far as ever from 
saying anything about the noise-value of a single area having a given shape. 
But if it is remembered that the integral calculith (the first general approach 
to determining areas) was developed using the concept of the real infinitesi-
mal, and indeed that many engineers today get along quite well without a 
mathematical sophistication much beyond this, it will be noticed that I 
have been establishing in the latter sections the basis for a conceptual treat-
ment of the noise-value of variously shaped areas using a system of identical 
areas having much in common with the traditional theory of the real infini-
tesimal. Areas of any shape, after all, can be construed as precisely as one 
wishes as consisting of many smaller regular identical sub-areas grouped to-
gether (the smaller the sub-areas, the better the approximation). 
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E.g. , 
The sum of the smaller areas approximates to the area of the figure itself. 
And if each of the smaller areas should happen to exert a force on every 
other smaller area, the sum of these partial forces would approximate to the 
internal forces existing in the figure itself. Construing the noise-relationship 
between two areas as a force (as we did in the last section), the sum of the 
noise-values between each sub-area in a figure would approximate to the 
noise-value of the figure itself, as closely as we care to determine it. 
Let me now take several figures of different shape and evaluate their 
relative noise-values in terms of the above. Notice: what is important is not 
the shape of the smaller units into which I divide the figure, but rather their 
identity to each other. For as indicated above, as long as the units are iden-
tical to each other, I need only consider the distance between them to dis-
cuss their relative contribution to the noise-value of the whole. For example, 
given area A subdivided as follows, 
the important fact is the distance p — q between the sub-areas p and q. It is 
irrelevant that the sub-areas are triangles in the first case, and circles in the 
second. We must only be careful that, in comparing the noise-value of two 
areas, eg..B and C, we use identical sub-units in evaluating each. 
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10. For convenience, I shall use circles as my sub-areas in the remainder of 
this paper. 
It will be recalled that the noisiest state of the visual field was defined 
to be that state in which maximum intensity white-noise was present at all 
points of the field. Thus, if I consider a field as consisting of many small 
circles of maximum intensity white-noise, the noisiest state of the field 
ought to occur whenever all of the circles making up that field are grouped 
together as closely as possible. Let me consider several possible configura-
tions of seven such circles of maximum intensity white-noise, evaluating 
their respective noise-values in terms of the sum of the inverse of the squares 
of the approximate distances between each of the seven circles in each case —
in accordance with the formulae discussed earlier. I shall number each 
circle in each configuration for reference, listing in the table which follows 
the value of the distance, square, and inverse for each pair in each config-
uration, and then giving the sum of the inverse squares of the distances 
apart for each configuration. The higher the sum, the noisier the config-
uration. (For uniformity of measurement, all circles will be drawn with 
diameters of 1"; and all measurements and computations are very approximate.) 
83. 
F.4.2
3 
84. 
85. 
A 9, 
5 
86. 
F. y. 7 
87. 
TABLE OF NOISE - VALUES 
Between 
circles 
Fig. 1 
I 
fig. 2 Fig. 3 
I 
Fig. 4 
I 
Fig. 5 
I 
Fig. 6 
I 
Fig. 7 
D S D 6 D S D S D S D 
1 - 2 1 1 1 T. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 - 3 1 1 1 1.75 3.06 .33 2 4 .25 2 4 .25 1 1 1 2 4 .25 2 4 .25 
1 - 4 1 1 1 2 4 .25 1 1 1 2.63 6.89 .145 1.75 3.06 .33 3 9 .111 3 9 .111 
1 - 5 1.75 3.06 .33 1.75 3.06 .33 1.50 2.25 .445 3 9 .111 1.75 3.06 .33 3.25 10.6 .095 4 16 .0625 
1 - 6 2 4 .25 2.63 6.89 .145 2.25 5.06 .198 2.63 6.89 .145 2.25 5.06 .198 3.75 14.0 .071 5 25 .04 
1 - 7 1.75 3.06 .33 2.63 6.89 .145 2.25 5.06 .198 4 16 .63 2.25 5.06 .198 4.25 18.0 .054 6 36 .028 
2 - 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.75 3.06 .33 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 - 4 1.75 3.06 .33 1 1 1 1.50 2.25 .445 1.75 3.06 .33 1 1 1 2 4 .25 2 4 .25 
2 - 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 .25 2.13 4.52 .22 2.25 5.06 .198 3 9 .111 
2 - 6 1.75 3.06 .33 1.75 3.06 .33 1.50 2.25 .445 1.75 3.06 .33 1.88 3.52 .284 2.88 8.28 .121 4 16 .0625 
2 - 7 2 4 .25 1.75 3.06 .33 2 4 .25 3 9 .111 2.25 5.06 .198 3.62 13.1 .076 5 25 .04 
3 - 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.25 5.06 .198 1 1 1 2.13 4.52 .22 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 - 5 1 1 1 1.75 3.06 .33 1.50 2.25 .445 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.50 2.25 .445 2 4 .25 
3 - 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.25 5.06 .198 2.25 5.06 .198 3 9 .111 
3 - 7 1 1 1 2 4 .25 2.25 5.06 .198 2 4 .25 1.68 3.52 .284 3.25 10.6 .095 4 16 .0625 
4 - 5 2 4 .25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 .25 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 - 6 1.75 3.06 .33 1 1 1 2 4 .25 1.75 3.06 .33 1 1 1 2 4 .25 2 4 .25 
4 - 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.50 2.25 .445 1.75 3.06 .33 1.75 3.06 .33 3 9 .111 3 9 .111 
5 - 6 1 1 1 2 4 .25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.75 3.06 .33 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 - 7 1.75 3.06 .33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 .25 2 4 .25 
6 - 7 1 1 1 1.75 3.06 .33 1.50 2.25 .445 1.75 3.06 .33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Approx. sums 
of inverse 
squares 
14.73 13.02 12.21 11.54 10.70 8.58 7.99 
With due allowance for the inaccuracies of quick computation with 
unwieldly fractions and gross measurements, a pattern clearly emerges. 
The noisiest combination of seven circles is Fig. 1, the least noisy Fig. 7. 
Remembering that these circles in combination were meant to represent 
sub-areas of closed figures, if one imagines a smooth curve drawn about the 
respective combinations, one can make the following conclusion: for a 
given contiguous area of uniformly intense energy, the noisiest possible 
configuration of that -area is a CIRCLE, which exists on a continuum thru 
increasingly angular configurations to the least noisy configuration of 
that area, the shape approaching a STRAIGHT LINE. 
The above is meant only as a rough guide to composition and further 
analysis. Like any other subject in art, if one is interested in the noise-
functions of particular shapes, careful and precise measurement and con-
trol would be required. 
Let me remind you that I have nowhere suggested that, because 
circles are noisier than squares, one ought (or ought not) to use circles 
rather than squares. The above is not intended as a program for compo-
sition with shapes, but rather as a means of unambiguously specifying the 
relationships between, and qualities of, whatever shapes one wishes to use. 
It adds to a method, not a theory, of visual composition. 
11. But the purpose of this Section of the paper was not to catalogue 
possibilities of noise functions, for they are unlimited. Rather, it was to 
describe a set of procedures adequate to the needs of the film composer. 
The above discussion suffices, I shall assume, to show that functions of 
perceptual space can be reduced to noise functions. The problem then 
becomes: what procedures are adequate to specifying, with clarity and flex-
ibility, noise functions, and functions of noise functions, etc.? (It was 
noted above that the story-board technique is inadequate to the task, for 
it is unable to specify continuous noise functions unambiguously. In general , 
any technique which does not make evident continuous noise functions 
must be rejected.) 
One must first remember that a film-composer does not begin with an 
overall functional sense of his work in mind. He begins with bits and 
snatches of noise functions (visual themes), pregnant with functional 
possibilities but undetermined by any systematic higher-order noise func-
tions. The procedure to be suggested, therefore, must not only be ade-
quate to describing noise functions once they are systematically deter-
mined by other noise functions, but also to describing the initial fragmen-
tary ideas of the composer in such a way that their possibilities as functions 
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of functions, etc., becomes most clearly and flexibly evident. 
12. It was shown above that a single continuous object of perceptual space-
time can increase the noise-level of the perceptual situation in five ways: 
(a) By increasing in size (i.e.,by increasing the contiguous 
area of the perceptual field in which a given average uni-
form intensity of energy is being maintained); 
(b) By increasing its rate of change of position in the per-
ceptual field (i.e.,by increasing the contiguous area of 
the perceptual field in which a given average uniform in-
tensity of energy is being maintained); 
(c) By increasing (shape-wise) in circularity; 
(d) By increasing the achromaticity (whiteness) of its color 
(or sound); 
(e) By increasing the brightness of its color, or sound (i.e., 
by increasing the average intensity of the energy presented). 
As is evident from the clauses, however, (a) and (b) can be considered 
identical. (But this only becomes pragmatically obvious when considering 
a second object. Given a second object, how can one change the noise-level 
of the perceptual situation by modifying the first object? One could change 
it in accordance with either (c), (d), or (e), of course; but one could also 
change it in accordance with either (a) or (b). Yet, as a direct analogue from 
gravitational theory again shows, to change the first object according to (a) 
is to change it according to (b), and conversely. Consider two masses, M1
and M2 . How could one increase the strength of the gravitational field 
around M1 and M2 by changing M2 ? Clearly, either by increasing the mass 
of M2 , or by moving it closer to M1 . The point, however, is that the change 
effected is the same. And if our only means of measuring the changing rela-
tive characteristics of two bodies is to measure the gravitational field between 
them, a change of gravitational field can mean only one thing (though, to any 
observer who could independently measure changes in distance and mass, it 
would mean one of two things, or some combination of the latter two). Thus, 
the noise-function seems identical to the gravitational function, and contiguity 
seems dependent upon the notion of field (though I shall assuredly not 
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discuss this here).) That is, to change in size is identical to changing one's 
rate of position in terms of the effect on the energy (i.e.,noise) field in the 
vicinity. 
Consequently, if I choose to say that an object increasing in either 
size or rate of change of position is changing in extension (i.e.,is being position-
ally accelerated), the upshot of the above is that the noise-effect of a single 
continuous object of perceptual space-time can be determined by specifying 
four parameters: . 
(1) a change in extension parameter; 
(2) a change in shape parameter; 
(3) a change in achromaticity parameter; 
(4) a change in brightness parameter. 
13. I shall now describe what I take to be a fundamental set of procedures 
for composing in film (or music, for that matter). For increased ease of 
exposition, I shall limit myself to discussing these procedures in terms of 
only three of the above four parameters, omitting a discussion of the pro-
cedure for specifying the change in shape parameter. (The means of extend-
ing the procedures discussed below to include this latter parameter, however, 
should be apparent.) 
The basic tools of the composer are to be an unlimited supply of 3 x 5" 
white cards tightly ruled, a pencil, and many erasers. 
NOISE 
TI ME 
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The 5" edge of each card is to be considered a temporal axis. There are to be 
three basic types of cards, corresponding to the three parameters of the per-
ceptual object: change in extension, change in achromaticity, and change in 
brightness cards. In addition, there are to be three additional types of cards 
which are to serve as the means of increasingly abbreviating the information 
given by combinations of cards: contiguity (i.e.,noise-level summation) cards, 
and rate of change (i.e.,acceleration) cards. The 3" edge of each card is to be 
considered as indicating the relevant noise metric. 
Having chosen a ruled line on a card as 'zero', (and the composer is free 
to choose any perceptual value as equal to 'zero', so long as he remains con-
sistent), having taken the other lines and spaces in order as representing equal 
perceptual differences, and having considered the 5" edge as representing a 
unit of time divisible in order as he wishes, the composer possesses a tool 
with which to express unambiguously a fundamental noise-function, whether 
continuous or otherwise. For example, the following card might represent 
an object changing in brightness from low to high (pegged at certain levels 
vis a vis zero level) every two seconds as indicated. 
0 
1 2 3 4 
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If this card were to be placed after another brightness card as follows, 
a B 
0 0 
... 
i 2 3 4 
1 
1_ 2 3 4 
Toc 
the composer would have indicated an object which, beginning at level two 
of brightness for one second, fell continuously during two seconds to level 
-2 where it remained for two seconds, then jumped discontinuously to level 
zero to begin the periodic fluctuation described above. Similarly, if the 
composer were to indicate for the interval To — Ta not only the brightness 
parameter of the object, but also its extension and chromaticity parameters, 
by placing an extension card and an achromaticity card directly above or 
below the brightness card, he would have provided all the information 
necessary to determine the effect of the object alone on the noise-level 
of the perceptual field during the interval To — Ta, though not during the 
preceding interval Ta — To . 
.E 
0
2 3 4 
B 
3
i 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
A 
I. 2 3 4 
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From the three vertical cards, the composer could then determine a con-
tiguity card showing the cumulative effect of the information given on the 
three cards (i.e. the total fluctuation over the interval To — Ta of the noise 
level of the perceptual field due to the object by itself). If this object were 
to be the only object in the visual field, the composer could now work back-
ward from this card by deriving from the pattern of contiguity evidenced 
during the interval To — Ta suggested functional possibilities of extension 
and achromaticity for the preceding interval Ta — . 
Similarly, if the composer were interested not only in the change of 
extension, brightness, achromaticity, and (cumulatively) contiguity during 
the interval Tj —Ta, but also in the rate of such changes (i.e. the pattern 
of acceleration of extension, or brightness, or contiguity), he could substi-
tute rate-of-change cards for any or all of the above, and work with these, 
substituting contiguity cards for cumulative rate-of-change effects, etc. 
Given a series of cards determining a noise-effect over a certain interval 
T. — Tx , 
B -------- _..__ -- -- • B - • . B • 
. 
-r-• _ _ __ _. _ . 
, r : 
T
The composer is free to condense all the information onto fewer cards if 
he wishes simply by reconstruing the metric of the temporal axis (the 5" 
margin) of the cards being substituted for the others. 
• illifi tra 
AO/EA 
rilM14111, 
'PILAW 
1 
- 
Tx T-rr 
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The 5" margin, that is, can represent whatever time interval the composer 
wishes, and substitutions made accordingly. Similarly, if in a series of 
cards the composer notices a pattern of noise fluctuation over some inter-
val which he wishes to employ (e.g.,) thematically, 
G -4-- 1 8 
_.. 
B - 3 T.Tr. 
he is free to abbreviate the pattern (e.g.,by calling it pattern `B-3') and sub-
stitute cards bearing the name of the pattern wherever appropriate. 
4 - - 
__ .. 
\ 
.—...• 
TA T IT 
It is the responsibility of the composer, of course, to be clear and consistent 
in his substitutuions. For example, if the name `B-3' were to mean a certain 
pattern over an interval of 10 seconds, it would be incorrect to substitute a 
card bearing the `13-3' into a context of an interval of only 5 seconds. (The 
composer could, of course, substitute a card bearing the name of a pattern 
like B-3 except for being temporally half as long: say `13-312'. But this is 
the name of a different, though related, pattern. It is not the same pattern 
as B-3.) 
When two or more objects are to be determined, the above tools and 
techniques need only be extended. For any interval Ti3 — Ta, individual 
objects could be represented as below, 
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(I) 
-r-
etc. 
and contiguity cards or rate-of-change cards substituted for either object I 
or object II, individually or collectively. The process becomes much more 
complex, but the principle remains the same. 
14. It ought also to be apparent that the composer who wishes to work on 
a less finely-controlled level need only use his cards to represent whatever 
objects he wishes, so long as he remains consistent and has a fine-enough 
functional sense not to violate the fundamentals in unifying the coarser 
elements. The point is that the above system provides the composer with 
the means of working with perceptual color and sound functions on any 
level of discrimination. If he wishes to be unconcerned with minute 
changes in time, or wishes to develop by substitution an overall temporal 
view of this work, he need only reconstrue the intervals specified by the 
5" margins of his cards; the length of a 5" card can as easily represent 5 
hours as 5 seconds. 
The above set of procedures, therefore, provides unlimited flexibility 
of substitution with unlimited accuracy of representation. The composer 
can try different combinations as easily as shuffling his cards with a pur-
pose. And, by the process of successive substitution, he can abbreviate 
entire sections of his work, enabling him to get a functional sense of the 
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whole, without losing accuracy of representation. (The advantages of such 
flexibility over the notebook techniques of composition ought to be obvious.) 
As suggested in passing earlier, the above set of procedures is also of 
advantage to the composer in that it provides him immediately with a tool 
wherewith to represent, compare, and contrast those initial fragmentary 
ideas with which he begins with the greatest possibility of sensing functional 
similarities and differences. Once further ideas are forthcoming, the extreme 
flexibility of substitution, etc., provides him with the means of functionally 
testing the ideas in an unlimited number of contexts quickly and precisely. 
15. In conclusion, let me remark that I have not given a 'notation' for film 
which would be of much use as a production script or as a readable summary 
of the completed film. From the pragmatic character of the above procedures, 
it ought to be apparent that a work of art cannot be transcribed discursively 
in such a manner that all, or indeed its essential, compositional functions 
are made simultaneously evident. (It is no accident that the inverse task of 
learning to understand the compositional functions of a work of art from 
its production script, as any major in musical composition will attest, is a 
long, and tedious process of creative reconstruction). What I have tried to 
suggest is a set of procedures by which the composer may compose his 
work with maximum clarity and flexibility of purpose. The task of trans-
lating a work of art composed according'to the above procedures into a 
production script is neither unimportant nor difficult in principle. But it 
is a task distinct from composition, the subject of this thesis. 
Evan Cameron 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Quine [4] , op. cit., p. 81. 
2. Johnson and Kiokemeister, op. cit., p. 15, for a similar 
formulation. 
3. Ibid, pp. 149-150. 
4. Sciama, op. cit. 
5. vide footnote in Austin, op. cit., p. 86. 
6. vide Land, op. cit. 
7. Bach, op. cit., p. 66. 
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